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ABSTRACT 
This paper demonstrates the use of applied organizational design to investigate possible 
mechanisms to allocate the resources of Space Station. First, a specific laboratory experimental 
environment (testbed) and baseline policy are developed using the salient technical features of the 
Space Station and past Space Shuttle experiences. The use of priority contracts to assist in 
contingent rescheduling of resources due to supply curtailments is established. Next, generalized 
versions of an English auction and Vickrey-Groves type sealed bid auction are designed and 
developed to allocate scheduled resource use and priority. Finally, these mechanisms are tested and 
evaluated in the testbed. The data demonstrates that the expected efficiency increases significantly 
using the auction mechanisms rather than allocations from first-come-first-served processes. 
However, the auction mechanisms do not produce outcomes near the 100% level of efficiency. 
Several results are dedicated to the revenue generating properties of the mechanisms and individual 
bidding behavior. 
Key Words: Mechanisms, pricing, uncertainty, fitting, experiments, priority, scheduling, auctions. 
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THE DESIGN OF MECHANISMS TO ALLOCATE SPACE STATION RESOURCES* 
I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
In this paper we report on a part of our investigation into possible resource allocation 
policies for the earth-orbiting space station which has been proposed by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA). This is a problem in "applied organization (mechanism) design" 
which requires a combination of methods from theory, history, and experimentation. The output of 
this research includes descriptions of two possible mechanisms, some of their theoretical properties, 
and measures of their perfonnance in an appropriately designed "testbed" environment.1 The 
evidence indicates that these are feasible designs, they will allocate resources, and that their 
perfonnance is superior to "traditional" procedures. We do not feel that this concludes all testing or 
that either mechanism has been developed to the point at which it could be instantaneously 
implemented. We do, however, think these two are the best prospects for continued development.2 
The details of the mechanisms, the testbed, and the perfonnance measures are provided so that others 
can try to improve on our efforts. 
Since this type of research is new and unfamiliar to many, we provide a guide to the path we 
took to answer the question: In what way should it be decided how resources on the space station 
are to be allocated? The process involved a complex interaction between theoretical, experimental 
and historical methods to understand new processes and their relationships to existing ones. We 
summarize it in six steps. First one has to identify the real problem to be solved. This involves 
discovery of the salient features of the space station, its environment, the players, and the 
perfonnance expected of any organization chosen to allocate resources. This process results in a 
generic model of the problem. The second step requires identification of current policies in use or 
under consideration by NASA, an extensive review of policies or mechanisms that have been 
proposed for similar generic problems, and the preliminary development of any new organizational 
design concepts that seem appropriate. Third, based on these generic models and the understanding 
of current policies, a specific testbed (a laboratory experimental environment) is created and a 
baseline mechanism (mimicking the important features of current policy) is modeled so that the 
perfonnance characteristics of other mechanisms can be evaluated in a sensible fashion. Fourth, 
specific mechanisms are created. This later step includes the necessary transfonnation of a 
theoretical description of a mechanism into an operative process: a language and a set of rules for 
infonnation processing and communication among participants, stopping rules, etc. In short, the 
game fonn has to be converted to procedures that will operate at least in the testbed environment. 
Fifth, experimental observations are generated, the specific mechanisms are redesigned to correct for 
any anomalies in perfonnance which the testing uncovered, and the environment is adjusted to make 
the testing even more rigorous. The sixth and final step involves the analysis of the data, the 
reporting of the perfonnance results and a listing of recommendations for further design and testing. 
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The end result of this systematic approach to the design of an organization was, in our case, 
two potential mechanisms which performed satisfactorily and which are now ready for further 
development. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the space station allocation problem, which 
led to this research, is portrayed. In Section III we recount the history of past practice and describe 
some of the literature on past research that might apply. This section is intended to provide 
information for the reader on the current state of the art in theory and in practice. Sections IV to VII 
contain descriptions of the mechanisms we have designed, how we evaluated them, and the data 
from those efforts. In Section VIII, we provide a terse summary of what we have learned both about 
policies for the allocation of resources on the space station and about the efficacy of our methods. 
IT. THE SPACE STATION ALLOCATION PROBLEM3 
The space station is planned to be an integrated facility of subsystems providing a variety of 
services (e.g. data management, manpower, pressurized volume) to users over time. The possible 
users of this facility are civil U.S. government, Department of Defense, commercial entities, 
universities, foreign governments, etc. Furthermore, the station itself will be a user of these 
resources, in that each subsystem requires inputs from other subsystems for operation and 
maintenance. The space station can be thought of as a non-linear input-output model among its 
subsystems. In addition, the space station will be a pioneer project with many new and untested 
technologies rendering the technical relationship among the subsystems uncertain (see Banks, 
Ledyard, and Porter [ 1986] and Fox and Quirk [1985] for details). This implies that the performance 
of the station and the resources it will be able to supply will be subject to considerable uncertainty 
over its lifetime. 
On the demand side, users will have to design and develop payloads which will consume 
station resources in varying degrees of intensity. In general, the demands for resources by payloads 
appear to be discrete (lumpy) and nonseparable (but not necessarily in fixed proportions). Thus, the 
overall space station allocation problem will involve the selection of users and the scheduling 
(manifesting) of payload demands within the uncertain operating capacities of the system. The 
processes by which allocations are chosen will affect payload design and the ultimate rewards from 
the use of the space station. (For a more extensive discussion of the space station allocation and 
decision-making problems, see Ledyard [1986]). To make things even more difficult, this 
manifesting problem must be performed with asymmetric information among the players. 
In summary, the salient features of the problem are: (1) there are multiple users with widely 
divergent goals, which creates a coordination and incentive problem, (2) each user has private 
information about the benefits and costs of their possible scientific or commercial projects, which 
creates an information problem, (3) each user has a a small number of possible technologies for 
pursuing the desired ends of their project (demands are discrete and lumpy), which creates a fitting 
problem, and (4) the availability of resources for payloads on the space station will be uncertain 
(either payloads may fail and free allocated resources for other payloads or deliveries to payloads 
may be unreliable with extensive interruptions), which creates a contingent scheduling problem. 
III. PAST AND CURRENT PRACTICE 
A. Space Shuttle Policy 
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In an attempt to develop an appropriate mechanism for space station, one must assess current 
practice. The natural candidate in this case is past policy regarding the Space Shuttle-Space 
Transportation System (STS) allocation policy.4 Our focus will be on the STS pricing policy and 
short-run allocation decisions. The stylized facts concerning the past policy toward STS users can 
be summarized as follows: 
a) Payload requirements (weight, length, orbit, e.g., etc.) are given to Shuttle manifesters in 
the form of an application (Form 100). 
b) System capabilities (performance envelopes, turnaround time, processing time, etc.) are 
determined by Shuttle supply managers and transmitted to manifesters. 
c) Payloads are scheduled to Shuttles on a first-come, first- served basis in accordance with 
launch date requests, conditional on fitting within system constraints. However, priority is generally 
given to national security payloads and payloads with severe launch windows (these are referred to 
as anchor points in the manifest). 
d) Compatibility assessments are made among the scheduled payloads via a "strawman" 
manifest which is then developed into a final manifest. 
e) A set of standard prices are charged to non-NASA users (there are no internal prices for 
NASA-sponsored payloads) and are based on a predetermined level of the pro-rata share of "cost" 
depending on user class (commercial, DoD, civil U.S. government, etc.). Some limited provisions 
are made for negotiated prices (based on "cost") for optional services. 
f) Remanifesting of scheduled payloads has been a common occurrence for the Shuttle 
because of launch delays. The past policy has used a fixed priority system for payload remanifests 
with priority based on origin of sponsorship. In particular, DoD has top priority with commercial 
paying customers next in line, and scientists last. 
These stylized facts emphasize two important features of the allocation problem we 
confront: (1) it must be determined which payloads should be scheduled together (the.fitting 
problem); and (2) the order of dispatch must be determined in those cases in which supply is 
different from the planned amount (the contingent scheduling problem). Our goal is to design 
mechanisms which perform these two functions in as (economically) efficient a manner as is 
possible.5 
B. Approaches To Fitting 
The problem of fitting resource demands into the capacity constraints of a system over time 
has been primarily attacked through the development of efficient algorithms to determine feasible 
solutions (See Reiter [1966, 1984) for a discussion on job-shop scheduling methods and related 
issues).6 In our investigation of various NASA programs we found that considerable effort is 
expended on procedures to facilitate the scheduling problem. As one example, consider the 
procedure used by NASA to allocate its Deep Space Network (DSN) resources (the set of antennas, 
support facilities, and transmission times) to a set of spacecraft. The DSN resource allocation 
process takes resource requirements (view periods and tracking specifications) from the managers of 
spacecraft and then schedules resources (via a computer-based system) to spacecraft so as to 
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maximize the ratio of total tracking time assigned ( over all stations). ( See Webb [1985] for a 
complete description of the DSN scheduling problem.) In this procedure, the initial plan is always 
characterized by the fact that activities are in conflict since requirements ( demands) typically exceed 
system capabilities ( supply). The conflicts among the users are resolved in a committee or by 
bilateral negotiations. 
For Spacelab missions, instrument requirements are given to the NASA Payload 
Engineering Division (Code EM) where, for a "given flight or series of flights, selected instruments 
are grouped by discipline to provide for minimum interface requirements among experiments and 
maximum use of common facilities," ( see the STS Investigators' Guide). Once a mission is selected, 
mission planning and resource timelines are developed by a committee of the selected users ( this is 
called the Investigators Working Group-IWG) which is chaired by a NASA mission scientist. This 
group is to resolve conflicts in resource scheduling and contingent events ( e.g. changes in 
instrument requirements, changes in STS performance, entry of new instruments in mission set) 
during the mission planning process. The IWG plans are transmitted to a mission manager who must 
coordinate the supply of Spacelab-STS services with experiment demands. The IWG tends to work 
by consensus and by bilateral agreements between parties in conflict. A flow diagram of the 
decision-making process for Spacelab missions is provided in Figure 1 in Appendix A. Considerable 
effort has been expended by NASA programmers to provide computer-based assistance in many of 
NASA's scheduling processes ( including integer-programming algorithms and expert systems). 
However, no one has evaluated the performance of any of these with respect to efficiency--only 
with respect to feasibility. 
The objective function of the scheduling process is usually based on some proxy for system 
utilization or on known payoffs. For the space station, a more complex approach to objectives is 
warranted. Given the diversity of the parties who will be using space station and given the 
asymmetry of information concerning benefits, the initial fitting of demands into resource constraints 
will require benefit information from users if efficiency is to be sought That is, if the objective is to 
schedule efficient allocations, a decentralized process is required. Ressenti, Smith, and Bulfin 
[1982], have developed an approach, using a combinatorial auction mechanism that is oriented 
towards the efficient scheduling of landing and takeoff slots at airports. The mechanism solicits 
information via complicated contingent willingness-to-pay data ( sealed bids). Scheduling is then 
performed by a computer-assisted market which finds the allocation giving the largest surplus ( in 
submitted bids) for which the corresponding conditional bids do not violate the slot capacities.7 
They found that their mechanism does not result in demand revealing bids but efficiencies are 
consistently in the mid to high 90% levels. Furthermore, their mechanism generally results in higher 
efficiencies and fewer learning effects (low initial efficiencies) than a single sealed-bid auction for 
slots with an after-market for exchanges. Subsequent to this study, questions have been raised with 
respect to its efficacy and the robustness of its performance as the number of slots, airlines, and 
airports becomes realistic since a 0-1 integer programming algorithm is the heart of their 
mechanism. 
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C. Approaches To Contingent Scheduling 
While the airport slot problem and corresponding combinatorial auction mechanism is a 
positive step towards solving the fitting problem, it does not assist in the replanning that will be 
needed because of the substantial uncertainty of supply inherent in the space station environment. It 
is obvious that to achieve efficient allocations, not only do we need information concerning net 
benefits in the use of planned resources, we also need information concerning losses or gains in 
surplus from adapting to changes in the planned use of resources. We are therefore interested in 
allocation schemes which not only assist in the allocation of resources (fitting of demands and 
resources) but also help in the reallocation of resources when contingencies arise. 8 
For the Shuttle, this situation has been handled by a policy of payload priorities based on 
origin (DoD, commercial paying customers) and anchor points (launch windows) instead of 
willingness-to-pay information (to direct efficient payload design). Such a policy has been a 
contributing factor in biasing lower-priority payloads towards smaller, easy-to-integrate, inefficient 
sizes, in order to minimize the opportunity costs of delay. 
For a Spacelab mission, on-orbit replanning of the timeline was handled through a 
committee process of the users and chaired by the NASA mission scientist. In general, provisions 
for allocations due to subsystem failures, payload malfunctions, and "unique" opportunities were 
required. Dispatching procedures for each six-hour period were developed by the user committee 
and endorsed by the mission scientist. 
The first instinct of most economists, when asked to solve this problem, would be to suggest 
the use of spot markets to reallocate resources. That is, wait until the available supply is known and 
then let prices clear the market. But this is not adequate here for two reasons. First, there will be 
long lead times between the design of payloads and their actual use of space station resources. It is 
therefore important to provide early guidance concerning reliabilities. Second, most of the resources 
are flows and have to be allocated over time before their total availability is known. When these 
difficulties arise, the typical alternative to spot markets is markets in contingent contracts such as 
insurance policies. We will concentrate our attention on a special type of contingent contract, called 
a priority contract. 9 
The economic literature on allocating priority is quite sparse. Harris and Raviv [1981) 
investigated (theoretically) various mechanisms for allocating resources when there are potential 
curtailments from uncertain demands on the system. They found that a monopolist could obtain his 
largest expected profit by segmenting demand on the basis of priority. Chao and Wilson [1985) 
developed a model of interruptible electric power which provides a theoretical justification for 
improvements in economic efficiency through the pricing of differing levels of priority service. 
Reitman [1985) provided a model of congestion-induced quality from service queues and the use of 
priority pricing to provide for spot markets for queue position. Banks, Ledyard and Porter [1986) 
demonstrated that traditional cost based pricing policies such as long-run marginal cost or cost­
benefit studies cannot be relied upon to produce allocative efficiencies in an environment with net 
output uncertainty. 
We will take from this literature the use of priority contracts. Our problem will then be the 
allocation of these contracts which will determine the queue position of individual demanders when 
resources are greater than or less than planned. These contracts simplify the reallocation procedure, 
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and the prices for these contracts can provide both users and station managers with information 
concerning the costs and benefits of reliability. 
IV. THE MODEL OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
The first step in the design process is to model the class of environments within which users 
of the space station will operate. We adopt a stripped-down, stylized description modeled after the 
Space Shuttle environment which we feel captures most of the salient features of the problem 
including low supply reliability and the fitting of lumpy users. 
A vector of resources, y eR 1C is potentially to be supplied at times t 1 and t 2• II(ti) is the 
probability y is supplied at ti, and 1 - II(ti) is ( then) the probability that y = 0 is supplied at t ;. This 
corresponds to the event tree in Figure 2.10 There are N = { 1 ,  .. . , n }  potential users of the resources. 
Each user has a set of feasible projects11 Di k: R; and a ( von Neumann-Morgenstern) utility function 
ui : Di x R � R describing i's preferences over projects and his monetary payments bi, where 
o ui !obi > 0. Without loss of generality, let ui (0, 0) = 0. 
The mechanism design problem, for this class of environments, can be split into two stages. 
First a collection of contracts is chosen; second, a method for allocating those contracts is designed. 
In the main body of this paper we explicitly consider only one set of contracts, based on priority, 
which are varied enough to enable the achievement of an efficient allocation in these environments. 
Information on complete contingent contracts is provided in footnotes. A priority contract 
corresponding to Figure 2 is a triple 'I';= <f ,di,bi), where/i e {1, 2} is a priority number, di e R.; 
is a vector of resources, and bi e R + is a monetary payment, paid whether resources are delivered or 
not. Define Kt � N as the set of users holding a contract of type f. (Each user is assumed to hold 
only one contract.) We say that a collection 'I'= ('I' 1, • • •  , 'I' n) of contracts is feasible if 
. !: di � y, f = 1, 2. Given a feasible collection of contracts, the actual allocation of resources is zeK1 
determined as follows: if Ji = l,  then user i receives di att1 if y is allocated attl> or di att2 if y is 
allocated at t 2 but not at t 1• If f i = 2, i receives di at t 2 if y is allocated at both t1 and t 2• Thus f = 1 
is a "first priority" contract, in that all users holding these are allocated resources at the first available 
opportunity. 12 
Let p1=II(t1) + (1 - II(t 1))II(tz) be the probability that y is available at least once, and 
p2 = II (t 1) II(t z) be the probability y is available twice. For any d � y and b � 0, let 
d;°(d,b) = argmax ui(di,b ). d; �d 
di ED; 
dt (d, b) would be the actual amount of resources consumed by i given a payment of b and a 
constraint of d. Then, 
Vi (Ji ,di ,bi)= Pt ui (dt(di bi),bi) + (1 - Pt )ui [0,bi] 
is user i 's expected utility for the contract (j i, di, bi). 
We are particularly interested in efficient allocations of contracts and resources. We assume 
the resource owner is risk-neutral and therefore evaluates a collection of contracts according to the 
t = 1 
t = 2 




Structure of Supply 
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g = quantity Cx.y) supplied 
n = quantity Cx.y) not supplied 
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expected revenue generated, 13 which is simply R ('P) = 'Li bi . Thus, a collection of contracts '¥ is 
efficient if it is feasible and there is no other feasible collection ql such that R ('¥' ) � R ('¥) and 
Vi ('¥)� Vi ('¥i ) for all i where one of these inequalities is strict With priority contracts in this 
environment, a collection of contracts is efficient if and only if the associated resource allocation is 
Pareto-optimal. We can, therefore, restrict our attention to designing mechanisms to yield desirable 
allocations of contracts. 
V. THE EXPERIMENTAL TESTBED 
The next step in the design process is to create an experimental testbed consistent with the 
model of the environment. This testbed is to be a specific example of the environment that will 
supply a hard test for mechanisms. 
The economic environment designed for the experiments follows the model in Section IV 
and involves two resources (X, Y) in fixed supply, two dates (t = 1, t = 2) and two possible outcomes 
(g , n ). The quantity of the goods for time period 1 are available (g ) with probability p1 and 
unavailable (n) with probability (1 - p1). Either the total quantity is available or no quantity is 
available for consumption. For time period 2 the probability of g is p2 and of n is (1 - pz). p2 is 
independent of the time period 1 outcomes. Table 1 shows the exact parameters used to represent 
the supply side of the experiments. There are two priority contracts associated with Figure 2 and 
Table 1 which we define as markets 1 and 2 respectively.14 For these priority contracts the 
probability that at least one X = 20, Y = 20 capacity will be available is p1 + (1 - p1)p2 = 516 and the 
probability that both X = 20, Y = 20 capacities will be available is p1p2 = 1 13. 
The demand side was created using monetary functions to induce value ( see Smith 1976). 
For subject i = l, ... , n values are induced by assigning each (xi , Yi ) e .Qi a monetary value of 
Mi (xi , Yi ). If a subject has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for money, gi (Mi ), then for 
that subject ui (xi ,yi , bi ) =  g
; [M; (x; ,Y; ) - bj ] .  If the subject is risk-neutral, then gi (M;) = Mi - b; . The 
(xi ,y; )  choices confronting the subjects are designed to be similar in spirit to those faced by a space 
station payload operator who must design an instrument and use some station resources to produce 
some output. ( See footnote 11.) In the experiments only discrete amounts were made available for 
the (x , y )  choices. In particular, each subject was given a 3 x 3 matrix of values corresponding to 
nine possible choices. There are two reasons for this. First, the experimental design was selected to 
make the fitting of demands a difficult task. If the mechanisms we are considering work well in this 
environment, they can easily be modified for operation in a more continuous demand structure. ( See 
Banks, et. al, [1986] for a design with more continuous demand surfaces.) Second, the nature of the 
resource requests and design choices for Spacelab type instruments is best approximated by discrete 
demands. The actual valuation tables used in the experiments can be found in Appendix B. Subjects 
could only use the nine discrete choices available to them on the valuation sheets. We used six 
subjects per experiment and we reassigned the six valuation sheets to the participants after each 
market period in each experiment. ( Subjects were told only that they would receive a new payoff 
sheet at the beginning of a market period.) 
The specific parameters ( payoffs and project sizes) chosen for the experiments required a 
computer search since the number of combinations that can fit within the available capacity limits 
Total 
TABLE 1 
Quantity of Probability of 
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X = 20, Y = 20, capacity 
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X = 20, Y = 20, capacity 












Expected Value= (5/6)($6.50) + (l/3)(5.25) = $7. 17. 
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and provide action in the market is sizable given six 3 x 3 matrices of choices. The selection rule for 
the parameters in our design was quite subjective. 
To develop a feel for the design, consider the configurations that maximize the expected 
value of the payoffs to the subjects using priority contracts in our tree structure which are listed in 
Table 2. Several observations are in order. First, the total capacity available (20 x 20) is not used up 
at the optimum because of the lumpy demand. Second, the priority 1 configurations required that the 
subjects with x = 5, y = 4 and with x = 3, y = 6 maintain an effective blocking "coalition" so that they 
cannot be replaced by configurations of participants not allocated resources in market 1. 
Furthermore, if we look at the valuation sheets found in Appendix B the individual with the x = 5, 
y = 4 configuration also has one with x = 5, y = 9 and a value of $2.25 and the subject with the x = 3, 
y = 6 configuration also has one with x = 3, y = 10 and a value of $1 .50, so some tension remains in 
the coalition to deviate. Third, if the x = 12, y = 9 configuration were changed to x = 12, y = 13, there 
would be considerable action to contest or fit with this larger configuration by the remaining 
participants. Thus, even though the numbers used for the experiments are contrived they do provide 
a "hard" test for any mechanism designed to coordinate demands and priority to allocate resources 
efficiently. 
As another way to provide a feel for the design, we calculated the distribution of the 
expected value of user benefits (the expected payments Mi ) of a random selection of 30,000 
combinations of configurations which fit in the capacity constraints. The combinations were found 
as follows: first an individual valuation sheet i was selected at random (without replacement) and 
then one of its configurations (xi , Yi ) was selected at random and placed in the highest priority 
market. Next, another individual valuation sheet j ::;:. i was randomly selected along with one of its 
configurations. This was placed in the allocation for the highest priority market such that 
(xi + xj) :::;; X and (yi + Yj) :::;; Y. This process continued until the set of available valuation sheets was 
exhausted. The expected value of Li Mi (xi , Yi ) was then calculated and the selection process started 
over again. If all subjects are risk-neutral then an efficient allocation of contracts (or resources) is 
one that maximizes the expected value of L;Mi (xi,Yi ). Therefore, the expected value of the payments 
for an allocation as a percent of the maximum of these expected values is a measure of the 
desirability of that allocation. We call this percent the (risk-neutral) efficiency level. We summarize 
the distribution of efficiency levels in Figure 3. Notice that the lowest possible efficiency level is in 
the 20-30% interval and that 85 percent of the distribution mass is between 75% and 40%. Hence, if 
we were to randomly allocate priority contracts we would expect efficiency levels in the range 40%-
70%. We will later use the distribution in Figure 3 to define a posterior distribution to evaluate our 
test statistics to measure performance of our mechanism designs. 
VI. THE BASELINE MECHANISM 
One might judge new mechanisms by their ability to beat the random selection described in 
the previous section. However, we feel there is a strong reason for not doing so. Users are payload 
designers and operators and, as such, will not present all possible projects for selection. They can 
and may filter out "inefficient" designs in response to random selection. Therefore, the correct 
baseline against which to measure the performance of new mechanisms is the performance of a 
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randomly selected and fitted. Rational agents may be able to improve on the unconstrained random 
selection of projects, unless the incentives of random selection (with a premium placed on "fitting") 
are so bad as to induce seriously inefficient project selection. 
To create this baseline standard within the experimental testbed, subjects were told that there 
were two markets (corresponding to the outcomes { (g ,  n )  and (n , g )} and { (g ,  g )} in Figure 2) each 
with capacity X = 20, Y = 20. Subjects could submit only one order consisting of an x and y 
configuration and a preference for ranking over markets 1 and 2. The orders were collected and 
randomly selected one at a time from a box and placed in the first market with capacity available in 
accordance with the stated preference rankings. When all the capacity or orders were exhausted a 
die was rolled. The orders in market 1 were filled if any of the numbers 1 through 5 appeared and 
the orders in market 2 were filled if the number 1 or 2 appeared.15 These probabilities were known 
by all participants prior to placing their orders. If a participant's order were filled she received the 
value associated with the configuration ordered. Since prices were not used to allocate resources, 
subjects needed to pay nothing.16 We call this baseline mechanism the Random Mechanism. Aside 
from its use as a performance standard, it is a reasonable representation of STS pricing and 
allocation policy prior to the "Challenger disaster." That policy, summarized in Section III, consisted 
of a posted price (which was zero for NASA sponsored payloads) and an allocation policy based on 
exogenous priority assignment and a first-come, first-served (which is essentially random) selection 
of available payloads. 
Three predictions about the behavior of users participating in the Random Mechanism can 
be derived from an analysis of their strategic situation. Once each participant has chosen a resource 
order and a preferred market <di ,Ji>, the mechanism selects and assigns at random. This selection 
process implies a probability that i will receive di in market 1or2. Let Hj (<d1 ,f1> • . . .  , <dn ,Jn> )  
be that probability. H} is the probability that d i will still be available inf when i's order is drawn. 
Hj does not depend on/; but does depend on/ j for j ::!- i. If p1 is the probability that contracted 
amounts with priority f are delivered then i 's expected value of an order <di ,f i >, given the orders 
of others, is 
Hj (di )p1 u i (di ,0) + [I -Hj (di )]H: (di )pru i (di , 0) 
where f = f i and r is the other market. (That is, if f = I then r = 2 and vice versa.) Thus, i's 
expected value, given the orders of others, is 
One prediction is immediate: to maximize expected value, f i = I  if and only if p1 > p2; that is, i will 
always rank higher the contract with the higher probability of delivery. (This is a dominant strategy, 
independent of the others' choices.) The second prediction is almost as direct and can be 
summarized as: individuals will choose project sizes smaller than their projects with the highest 
payoff (so they may fit).17 The third observation is that projects chosen under the random 
mechanism will "regress to the middle." That is, compared to the allocation which maximizes 
expected aggregate benefits (see Table 2), the participant will choose larger than that if the allocation 
is small (like 2 in Table 2) and smaller than that if the allocation is large (like 1 in Table 2). 
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Therefore, not only might this mechanism pick projects with benefits less than those it excludes, but 
also almost all projects that are selected will be inefficiently sized.18 The issue is whether any other 
mechanism can do better. 
VII. THE DESIGNS 
The next step in the mechanism design process is to create generic designs which seem 
appropriate for the problem and then to test it. 
A. Design #1 - Description 
The first design we report is a generalization of the English (or ascending-bid) auction (see 
Cox, Roberson and Smith [ 1980] for a description and analysis of a traditional English auction). We 
call it the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM)-Bulletin Board. 
AUSM does not require all participants to be in the same room (as in Sotheby's art auction); 
they can communicate "bids" through an electronic bulletin board. Nor does it require a rapid 
sequence of bids to be made (as in the art auction); participants can be allowed any length of time 
thought to be desirable to consider their demands. A USM is not a spot market and requires no 
auctioneer. 
The English auction, upon which AUSM is based, is a non-tatonnemont process that is 
commonly and widely used to auction single items of uncertain value to multiple bidders. At each 
instant during the auction there is a potential allocation across contracts, which is common 
knowledge. Any agent can enter a bid at any time. The bid is common knowledge. There is a 
common update rule which specifies how a new bid can create a new potential allocation� The 
process stops when no new bid is made soon enough after the last bid. The potential allocation is 
then the actual allocation. 
For auctions of single items the potential allocation is usually expressed as "the item goes to 
the current highest bidder who will pay their bid," and a bid is "a stated willingness to pay." The 
update rule is that the person bidding becomes "the current highest bidder at that bid" if their bid is 
higher than that of the current highest bidder. If not, no change occurs. 
For multiple contracts of multiple dimensions, the principle is exactly the same. There is a 
supply of each of F contracts to be allocated. The capacity of each is ye R!. [We can easily 
modify this to accommodate an environment in which y depends on f e F]. For our environment, 
F = {1, 2}, andy e Rf. 
A potential allocation is a feasible collection of contracts 'I'· A bid is simply a proposed 
contract (f , d i , b i). A bid replaces a contract (or group of contracts) in the potential allocation 'V if 
and only if the bi is higher than the sum of the bids offered by those being replaced. More formally, 
let K1 be the agents who hold contracts in the current potential allocation off and let R � K1. If 
2t + I: di;;::.; d i and b i;;::.; I: bi where z1 = y - I: dw, then (f, d i, bi ) replaces the collection jeR jeR weK1 
{(j , ci ,  b i)};eR in 'I'· If there is no suchR then the new allocation equals the old (i.e., i's bid is 
rejected). If there are more than one such R, we assume that i replaces the R with the smallest value 
of I:;eR bi. Trader i's utility for the potential allocation of contracts 'Vis Vi ('Vi) if i eK1 for f = 1 or 2 
and is O otherwise. 
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The potential allocation can be publicly displayed on a (computerized) Bulletin Board as, for 
example, in Table 3. For this example, if bidder 2 wanted to be manifested on the contract "priority 
l "  for an amount of (x ,y) = (10, 3), 2 could do so by bidding (10, 3, 0). If 2, on the other hand, wanted 
(x,y) = (12, 6), 2 would have to bid at least 201 (to bump 3). If 2 wanted (x,y) = (12, 11), 2 must bid 
at least 501 (to bump 7) and if 2 wants (6,16), 2 must bid 701 (to bump both 3 and 7). 
We chose this basic mechanism for several reasons: (1)  the practical success of the single 
unit English auction as signaled by its widespread use, (2) the feeling, based on experimental 
experience, that in an environment in which the bases for common knowledge are little understood 
or controlled, iterations allow subjects to "feel their way" in a manner in which sealed-bid, one-shot 
auctions do not, 19and (3) a theoretical analysis of its properties. Let us briefly expand on the last. 
We emphasize two facts about the A USM-Bulletin Board. First, given a proposed allocation 
any i can, with a high enough bid, change the proposed allocation to one in which i 's contract f is 
for any amount less than or equal to y . Second, the proposed allocation puts a lower bound on how 
much i must bid in order to achieve any desired allocation on contract f. Let �i ('!'•) represent the set 
of contract allocations to which i can unilaterally cause 'I'• to be changed with some bid. We call 'I'• 
a simple equilibrium if 'I'• is feasible and if Vi = 1, . . . , n ;  �i ('!'•) n {'I' I vi ('!')> vi ('!'*)} = 0. That 
is, no i can unilaterally improve his position since any bid high enough to cause i's quantity di to be 
included in the allocation of contract f will be higher than the value of the benefits attained from 
those di units of contract!. Simple equilibria are contract allocations which are individually 
"stationary" allocations of AUSM. This is a fairly big set, not all of which are desirable. Further, we 
feel that reasonably well informed traders will be able to avoid some of them. To see how, consider 
a slightly different mechanism. 
Suppose each i chooses a contract mi = (f , di , bi ). Given m = (m1, . • .  , m11), a potential 
allocation of contracts 'I'• (m) is chosen as follows: for eachf pick Kr to max. I: bi subject to 
1eK1 
. I: di � y . Then allocate to i the contract f in the amount of di , bi if i e Kr. One can think of this 1eK1 
as a game, G ,  with strategies mi and outcome function 'I'* (m ), with allocations picked to maximize 
the aggregate stated willingness to pay. It could be used as a "sealed bid" mechanism. We call 'I'* is 
a non-cooperative equilibrium allocation of G ,  if 'I'* ='I'* (m *) and for each i, 
Vi ('!'*);;:: Vi ('I'* (m* !mi ) V mi, where (m* /mi ) is the vector m• with mt replaced by mi. It is an 
obvious fact that if 'I'* is a non-cooperative equilibrium allocation of G ,  then 'I'* is a simple 
equilibrium of AUSM. The converse is not necessarily true. 
Based on previous experimental experience with games such as G ,  it is not unreasonable to 
expect in experimental testing with replications of the A USM-Bulletin Board that the final 
allocations will be non-cooperative equilibrium allocations of G.  Not all simple equilibria will occur 
in replicated situations when subjects can learn to avoid "bad" dynamics. Of course what the 
mechanism designer is really interested in is not the equilibria but the efficiency of the equilibrium 
allocations. Unfortunately, even if only non-cooperative equilibria occur, the associated allocations 
may not be desirable. 
Because of the lumpy nature of the users projects, there are non-cooperative equilibrium 
allocations of G which are not efficient contract allocations. There may be changes in those 
allocations involving several traders simultaneously which can make all better off. In particular, if, 
TABLE 3 
Priority 1 Priority 2 
Bidder x y bid Bidder x y bid 
7 2 10 500 1 15 2 50 
3 6 5 200 4 1 10 75 
5 4 8 100 
Supply 20 20 Supply 20 20 
Slack 12 5 Slack 0 0 
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during the auction, there is a large user who is part of the current potential allocation and who has a 
fairly high bid, it may be too costly for any one small user to displace him even if it is possible that 
several small users can together receive more benefits than the single large user and should replace 
him. In this situation unilateral actions by one user are not sufficient to drive the mechanism to a 
more efficient allocation of contracts.20 
In our initial testing of the A USM-Bulletin Board, we had hoped that these complications 
caused by the variable size demands would be overcome by the subjects. But early data (reported in 
detail below) suggested efficiency levels of only 75-85%. We therefore felt it important to try to 
overcome this limitation of the mechanism. To do so, we had to improve the ability of the 
mechanism to recognize when to replace one big user with two or more little users. Our solution 
was not only to allow small users to coordinate their bids but to encourage them to do so. We 
created a new mechanism by modifying AUSM in the following ways. A public "standby" queue 
was allowed in which any agent could post a "proposed bid" (j ,  di , bi ) which they (presumably) 
would be willing to have included in a coalitional bid. Because of the possibility of joint bids from a 
group 'Y of individual agents, we expected different equilibria with the queue than we had 
hypothesized would arise in AUSM without the queue. 
Let 'Y � {l , ... , n} be an arbitrary coalition of agents and let (m •Im 'Y) be the vector m • with 
m;* replaced by mi for all i e y. We Call 'JI• a strong non-cooperative equilibrium of G if 
'I'* ='I'• (m •) and for each coalition 'Y and each m 'Y * m •'Y there is at least one i e 'Y such that 
Vi ('!'• (m *))> vi ['JI• (m • /m'Y)]. If 'I'• is a strong non-cooperative equilibrium of G ,  then 'I'• is a non­
cooperative equilibrium of G.  The converse is not necessarily true. 
Our hope was that offering the subjects the opportunity to "publicly" coordinate their bids 
through the queue would lead them to strong non-cooperative equilibria of the game G (if such 
equilibria existed). If that occurred, then this variation in the AUSM rules would solve our problem 
since those equilibrium allocations of G are efficient. 
The queue was the only major design change we made in response to early testing. There 
were, however, two other minor, but significant, variations in design which we chose in response to 
experimental testing. Originally, we had a stopping rule (which specifies when the provisional 
manifest is to be accepted as final) which had some undesirable effects. The auction would run for T 
minutes and the allocation at T would be final. Under this rule, very little bidding occurred in the 
pilot experiments until T - e when a flurry of bids were presented. Allocations were almost random. 
This was easily solved by changing the rule to the more traditional one in which the auction ends if 
no new bids occur after S seconds, where S is a design choice. The other variation concerned the 
commitment entailed in placing an order in a market. In one pilot, we used the same ordering 
process as above, except that subjects could remove existing orders and change bids up or down 
while in a market. There was no queue, but combining to move to different markets was allowed. 
This had an effect similar to the first stopping rule. Without commitment, nothing serious happened 
until T - e. We fixed this by revising the rules, by which bidding could be done, in a way which 
made each bid a potentially binding contract. Further, an explicit improvement rule, for bids, was 
added. Finally, in our initial design of the standby queue we allowed participants with orders in the 
standby queue to veto proposals combining with their order. We abandoned this rule in favor of 
committed bids in the queue when we found no vetos. 
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B. Design #1 - As Tested 
When the market opened subjects would submit an order consisting of a market or the 
standby queue, an x and y choice and a bid by raising their hand and being identified. Their order 
would be accepted if it could fit within the available capacity of the market requested, if it could 
displace existing orders with lower bids, or if the standby queue was requested. If a subject wanted 
to use the standby queue he had to indicate for which market the bid was tendered. Furthennore, if a 
subject's bid in the standby queue were combined with another order, then any standing order the 
subject had in a market was canceled. Finally, to aid in the search process for the best 
configurations, subjects were allowed to move existing configurations to other markets and/or 
change their configuration and bid if it could fit in the available capacity. However, if a subject did 
change his configuration in a market he had to improve the bid of the total orders he was displacing 
including (if necessary) his original order. For example, suppose the orders in market 1 were as 
follows: 
Market 1 
Subject x y ·Bid 
2 12 9 150 
4 5 4 100 
5 3 6 75 
If subject 2 wanted to change his configuration to x = 12, y = 13 he would have to bid more than 225. 
The bid improvement increment was set at 5. If an order was displaced the subject was allowed to 
reorder through the process above and submit any feasible order he or she wanted. The auction 
stopped when there were no new orders or order changes within 30 seconds of the last order. When 
the market closed a die was rolled. If the number 1 through 5 appeared the orders in market 1 were 
filled. If the numbers 1 or 2 appeared the orders in market 2 were filled. If an order was filled the 
subject was given his redemption value minus his bid. If a subject 's .order was not filled his bid was 
subtracted from his accumulated earnings. If a subject did not have an order in a market the subject 
received zero earnings for the market period. At the beginning of the experiment each subject was 
given 7 dollars of working capital to add to his earnings since losses in any market period were 
possible.21 
The A USM mechanism without a queue was also tested. The instructions for both A USM 
mechanisms can be found in Appendix C. 
C. Design #2 - Description 
The second design we report is based on a Vickrey-Groves type of sealed bid auction 
(Vickrey [1961 ]), where the prices charged to a user for resources are a function only of what the 
other participants bid. This then creates the correct incentives for the participants to truthfully reveal 
their willingness to pay for all possible contracts. Vickrey-Groves mechanisms, however, require 
each bidder to report an entire demand function, thus rendering the informational tractability of such 
a mechanism problematic in an environment with multiple units and multiple dimensions. 
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Therefore, we modify this auction by constructing a mechanism with iterations wherein each 
participant selects only one resource demand per trial of the process, and where prices at each trial 
are consistent with the logic of the Vickrey-Groves auction. It is thought that, with sufficient 
iterations, information will be generated through the prices which will accurately reflect the "cost" of 
all possible contracts. 
The process proceeds in time periods 1, ... , a., . . . prior to any realizations of supply. At 
time a., each i e N privately submits a contract (f (a.), di (a.), bi (a.)). For each f, define N1 (a.) as 
those users submitting a request for a contract of type f. Let 
For a contract of type f, r(f, a.) identifies all feasible coalitions; i.e., all groups of users whose 
collective bids are feasible, while K1 (a.) selects the coalition with the maximum sum of bids. If 
i e K1 (a.), then 'Yilf ,a.) is simply K1 (a.) - {i }, while if i � K1 (a.) then 'Yi (f, a.) identifies the coalition 
in r(f, a.) which 1)  would remain feasible if i were added, and 2) maximizes the sum of bids of its 
members. Thus, joining with 'Yi (f, a.) is i 's "best chance" of acquiring a contract of type f, given the 
behavior of the other participants. Given a vector d(a.) of resource demands, the "price" Pilf, a.) that 
trader i faces for contract f is equal to either the social cost of i being in K1 (a.) in terms of revenue 
foregone by i 's inclusion, or the minimum amount bi needed to become a member of K1 (a.), holding 
other traders' bids constant. In the former, the first term on the RHS of the price equation is the 
amount generated if i did not participate; thus, subtracting off the bids by other members of K1 (a.) 
gives an equivalent version of the Vickrey-Groves "second price" auction of a single unit of a good. 
Thus, given d (a.) and assuming risk neutrality, bidding one's expected value for a contract is a 
dominant strategy. In the latter, the first term is simply the sum of bids of the members of K1(a.); 
thus, subtracting off the bids of i 's "best chance" coalition gives the amount i would have had to 
have bid. 
Before proceeding to a.+ 1 each i observes {Pi (f, a.)}fef, as well as d (a.). Thus, at each 
trial, the participants gain information concerning not only the demand for resources and contracts 
that they (provisionally) acquire, but also for those which they do not. In this way, as the iterations 
proceed and bidders search for their "best" alternative, the mechanism may lead to an efficient 
outcome, if participants adopt their "short-run" dominant strategy of bidding their true value. 
The process stops at a. if K1(a.-1) =K1(a.), "i/f e f. That is, the process only stops when 
some sort of stability has been reached wherein the set of participants acquiring resources for each 
contract type remains unchanged. 
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D. Design #2 - As Tested 
The determination of allocations and the calculation of individual prices for this mechanism 
is an enormous task which cannot be done by hand in an effective manner. Thus, for testing this 
mechanism, all communication and calculations were made using a network of personal computers 
(PCs). The PCs were connected on a local area network with a controller PC being the center where 
messages were received, prices were calculated and allocations were determined, and then this 
information was transmitted back to subjects. 
At the beginning of a trial in a market period an individual would submit a configuration 
(x, y )  and select either market 1 or market 2 (but not both markets). The subject would then enter a 
bid for the configuration. After each individual sent his message to the center it calculated the 
provisional allocation and prices for each participant. Each individual user was then informed of the 
provisional traders in each contract and their configurations based on the trial messages. In addition, 
each subject received a private price message which described their potential payment if they were 
part of the provisional allocation, or (if they were not) the amount they would have had to bid in 
order to have their configuration included in the provisional allocation. The algorithm used to 
calculate allocations and prices and to return this information to subjects took less than one second to 
transmit after the last message was entered. Furthermore, each subject had displayed on their screen 
the history of the last three trials including provisional allocations and prices. Appendix B supplies 
the subject screen display for this mechanism. 
The stopping rule for allocating the contracts was partially sequential. In particular, the 
process stopped if the same subjects and configurations occurred in the markets (contracts) three 
times in a row (rule A). Otherwise, market 1 closed after t 1 trials were exhausted; market 2 closed 
after t 2 trials if rule A were not executed, where t 2 > t 1• · 
The only restrictions on the individuals messages were that bi > O (and integer valued) for 
each trial, the (x , y)  must be one of i 's nine choices, and a subject could submit a bid for market 1 or 
market 2, but not both markets, in the same trial. There was no ratchet (improvement) rule for 
individual bids in the process and a bid was not necessarily binding because one can bid "very high" 
in trial t and then bid almost zero in trial t + 1. We chose this set of rules to allow individuals to 
"easily" search for combinations. The instructions for this experiment can be found in Appendix C. 
The rules above were developed in response to early testing. Initially we did not close the 
markets sequentially. However, the process was pushed by the subjects to the last trial in most 
instances (even with 40 trials) and since an individual could only bid for market 1 or 2 (not both) 
there was substantial excess supply at the close. We also instituted a rule in the early testing which 
required individuals to better their previous bids in the market they were ordering. This rule caused 
individuals to be cautious in their bidding or "locked" them into larger projects and so was 
eliminated. 
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. Measurement 
We measure three aspects of mechanism performance: efficiency, revenue, and individual 
behavior. The overall performance of the mechanisms is determined by using expected values of 
efficiency. This does not necessarily measure the ex ante efficiency of mechanisms since it does not 
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account for the risk preferences of the subjects;22 nevertheless, it  does measure the ex ante system 
performance from the point of view of a risk neutral planner. We also consider the extent to which 
revenue is generated by each mechanism. Finally, we evaluate individual behavior for how well it 
corresponds to theoretical Nash equilibrium behavior. 
Table 4 contains the relevant information for each experimental session. Recall, for each 
session, we randomized the redemption value sheets at the beginning of a market period. 
B. Overall Mechanism Performance 
The mean efficiency (percent of the maximum expected value (µ)) and the associated 
standard deviation ( o') and coefficient of variation ( v) for each mechanism can be found in Table 5. 
We see that both AUSM and Iterative Groves mechanisms generate efficiencies near the 80% level, 
while the Random mechanism produces efficiencies close to 65%. Figure 4 provides the histograms 
of efficiency for each of the mechanisms. While this difference may not seem substantial, recall that 
the distribution of combinations in Figure 3 shows that there are relatively few choices that can 
produce efficiencies above 75%. If we were to use this as our posterior distribution, we would place 
a higher weight on observations with higher efficiencies. The nature of the underlying distribution 
of combinations found in Figure 3 suggests the use of nonparametric methods for our statistical 
analysis. We will use the Wilcoxon Rank Sum to test the equality of distributions of efficiency 
generated by each mechanism. In particular the z scores to be reported are derived from testing the 
hypothesis of equality of distributions versus strict inequality of distributions. Table 6 provides the 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for each mechanism using the data from all periods. That is, we have 
pooled the data from each experiment. While this affords more degrees of freedom we may be 
biasing results if substantial learning occurs in a mechanism. We shall check for these biases a bit 
later. 
The distribution free prediction intervals of efficiency for each mechanism with lower bound 
.90 for their coverage probability are: 
[74.8, 86.8] AQ 
[71 .5, 83.9] A 
[67.7, 88.1]  IG 
[43.5, 83.5] RP 
Our statistical measures in Table 6 support the following ranking of the mechanisms by 
efficiency as follows: 
TABLE 4 
Summary of Experiments 
Subject Number of 
Experiment Mechanism Contract Pool Periods 
l *  Random Priority Caltech 2 
2* Random Priority Caltech 3 
3 AUSM Contingent Caltech 5 
4 Random Contingent Caltech 2 
5 AUSM Contingent Caltech 4 
6 Random Contingent Caltech 3 
7* Random Priority Caltech 2 
8 AUSM Priority Caltech 5 
9 AUSM Priority Caltech 5 
with Queue 
10 AUSM Priority Caltech 5 
with Queue 
1 1  AUSM Priority Caltech 5 
12 Random Priority PCC 5 
13 Random Priority Caltech 5 
14 AUSM Priority Caltech 5 
15 AUSM Priority Caltech 5 
with Queue 
16 AUSM Priority PCC 5 
17 AUSM Priority Caltech 5 
with Queue 
18 Iterative Priority Caltech 5 
Groves 
19 Iterative Priority Caltech 5 
Groves 
20 Iterative Priority Caltech 5 
Groves 
21 Iterative Priority Caltech 5 
Groves 
*These experiments were conducted in conjunction with pilot experi-
ments testing various forms of the AUSM process. 
Caltech = California Institute of Technology 
PCC = Pasadena City College 
TABLE S 
Efficiency by Mechanism (Priority Contracts) 
Mechanism µ (j v 
Random (R) 63.5 10.0 . 16 
Iterative Groves (/G) 77.9 6 .8  .09 
AUSM (A) 77.7 4 .1  .05 
AUSM with Queue (AQ) 80.8 4.0 .05 
TABLE 6* 
Rank Sum Test (All Periods) 
IG A AQ 
R z =4.39 z =4.36 z =4.72 
<l =  .000 <l =  .000 a =  .000 
JG z =-.004 z = 1.58 
<l =  .480 a =  .057 
A z = 2.12 
a =  .017 
• a indicates the level of significance for 
the test that the efficiency of the 
mechanism in the column equals that in 
the corresponding row. 
Range 
[39, 76] 
[60, 91 ]  
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C. Efficiency by Period 
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R <A =JG < AQ 
with 
(AQ - JG ) $'. (AQ - A ) < (A -R). 
The mean efficiency per period for each mechanism can be found in Figure 5. We notice 
that for the Random mechanism the level of efficiency tends to increase over time. In particular, the 
mean and standard deviation of efficiency for periods 3 and above is 69.4 and 5.4 respectively. Thus, 
we see that efficiency increases with repetition in the Random mechanism (the reduction in the 
standard deviation in the later periods suggests that these higher efficiencies will be maintained. See 
Figure 1 5-20 in Appendix D for the time series data). A preliminary explanation of this trend is 
based on individual choices which select larger projects in early periods and smaller projects in later 
periods so as to fit As an indication of this fact, Figures 6 and 7 provide the excess capacity per 
dimension by period for each mechanism. 
For AUSM with and without a queue and Iterative Groves, there is no significant effect of 
repetition. The mean efficiency for periods 1 and 2 was 77. 1 for A, 8 1 .6 for AQ, and 76.8 for IG, 
while the mean efficiency for periods 3 and above was 78. 1  for AP, 80.2 for AQ, and 78.6 for IG. 
(See Appendix D for the time series of efficiency.)23 
In summary, we see that AUSM and Iterative Groves mechanisms clearly outperform the 
Random mechanism in terms of our measure of efficiency. The gap in efficiency is reduced but not 
eliminated when the Random process is repeated with the same subjects. The addition of the queue 
in A USM improves efficiency, but only slightly. 
D. Revenue Generation 
In Section VIIA we saw that, on theoretical grounds, A USM with a queue should be more 
efficient than without a queue in allocating resources. Does this mean more revenue is generated 
from the process, or does the ability to form "coalitions" via the standby queue reduce the revenue? 
Tables 7 and 8 provide the mean revenue (total and by market) for each treatment, and the associated 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation. Figure 8 provides the histogram of the overall 
revenue generated from the processes. 
From Table 7 we see that the addition of the standby queue results in a higher mean revenue 
and a shift in the support to the right. If we look at the revenue generated by market we see that with 
a queue, the volatility of revenue is fairly low for market 1 and high for market 2. Without a queue, 
revenue from each priority contract is relatively volatile. Of course, priority 1 contracts received 
higher bids. Specifically, priority 2 contracts have a mean bid 1/3 that of priority 1 contracts 
(approximately the difference in probability of each market being filled). Table 9 supplies the rank 
sum and t tests for the overall revenue generated by each of the A USM and IG treatments, while 
Table 10  provides these same tests for each of the markets. 
We see that the existence of the standby queue results in significantly higher revenues and 
this comes from higher revenue generated in both markets 1 and 2. If we look at the time series of 
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Total Revenue Generated 
µ O' v 
404.5 48.7 . 12 
475.7 52.0 . 1 1  
388.4 1 1 8.2 .30 
TABLE 8 





Market 1 Market 2 
µ O' v Range µ O' 
302.2 52.9 . 1 8  [ 154, 365] 102.3 22.6 
353.7 36.2 . 10 [300, 425] 122.0 27.5 
284. 1 85. 1 .29 [ 160, 449] 108. 1 66.3 
TABLE 9* 
Rank Sum and t -Test for Overall Revenue Generated 
AQ JG 
A z = 3 .69 t = 3.59 z =-.65 t =-.55 
Cl =  .00 Cl =  .07 Cl =  .25 Cl =  .29 
AQ z =-2.85 t =-2.95 
Cl =  .00 Cl =  .00 
*ex indicates the level of significance for the test that 
the revenue generated by the mechanism in the 










Rank Sum and t -Test in Priority Markets 
Market 1 (AQ) Market 2 (AQ) 
A z = 2.25 t = 2.48 z = 3.69 t = 4.45 
a =  .01 ex =  .01 a=  .00 ex =  .00 
*ex indicates the level of significance for the test 
that the revenue generated by the mechanism in 




TABLE 1 1  
Mean Revenue 








t -Tests for Mean Revenue - Early vs  Later Periods 
A 1 and 2 
A 3+ 
AQ 1 and 2 
AQ 3+ 
IG 1 and 2 
A 3+ 
t = 2.65 
ex=  .01 
t = -2.29 
ex =  .01 
t = 2.68 
a = .00 
AQ 3+ 
t = 4.44 
CX =.00 
t = -2.68 
ex =  .00 
t = .35 
ex =  .36 
IG 1 and 2 IG 3+ 
t = -.53 t = .93 
a = .30 ex = .18 
t = -2.13 t = -.16 
a = .03 ex =  .43 
t = -2.80 t = -1.07 
a = .01 ex = .15 
t = -3.65 t = -1.53 
ex =  .00 CX = .07 
t = 1.16 
ex =.13 
*a indicates the level of significance (one-sided) for the test that 
the revenue generated by the mechanism in the column equals 
that in the corresponding row. 
18  
in the revenue in AUSM which is  traceable to the revenue generated in market 1 .  No such trend is 
found by examining the time series for AUSM with a queue. We also notice that the revenue 
generated by IG is quite volatile. Table 1 1  supplies the mean for periods 1 and 2 and periods 3+ for 
each mechanism. From Table 12 we notice that this trend is significant for AUSM (the same is true 
for IG). 
Since the only difference between the AUSM treatments is the standby queue, it is natural to 
examine its utilization in the experiments. Figure 9 supplies the time series utilization of the standby 
queue vs. the revenue generated in our four experiments. We see that the use of the standby queue 
and revenue generation are unrelated. Thus it seems that the mere existence of the standby queue 
provides enough pressure to increase bids. 24 
It is clear that AUSM generates a significant amount of revenue. One question that remains 
is whether the increase in revenue in AUSM is offset by the increased efficiency gains so that 
subjects as a whole are better off participating in AUSM rather than the Random process. For this 
design, the answer is no. The Random Process generated a total of $4.50 more in total expected 
subject payments per period when compared with AQ; $3.02 when compared with A; and $2.84 
when compared with IG. 
E. Individual Choice 
Random Process. As we detailed in Section VI, we would expect the Random Process to generate 
choices which are consistent with "scaled down" projects. Specifically, from the redemption value 
sheets in Appendix B, notice that if each individual chose the largest project only one order would fit 
per market. However, if each subject chose his smallest project everyone could fit in one of the 
markets. Out of the 102 orders filled in the Random Process, six orders submitted were an 
individual's  smallest project while nine orders had the largest project submitted. Table 13 supplies 
the average size (X , Y) submitted by subjects over time. This table exhibits an updating phenomena 
on the part of the subjects. 
As further evidence of this behavior notice that the valuation sheets (Appendix B) show that 
the project in the middle of each sheet is less than or equal to 10  units in each dimension, while any 
increase in the X or Y dimension from the middle results in an X or Y greater than ten, with the 
exception of sheet 3. Thus, if we look at the number of projects submitted whose X and Y values are 
less than or equal the project in the middle of the sheet or less, we find they constituted over 80 per 
cent of the submitted orders. Hence, the Random process tends to push projects to smaller sizes. 
As a final note, the ranking of markets by probability (see Section VI) was never violated by 
a subject in the experiments. 
AUSM. Given the rules of AUSM (ignoring the dynamics), were the final allocation and bids a Nash 
equilibrium? That is, using expected values, could anyone change his bid (x , y ,  b)  without violating 
the AUSM rules and be made better off? The answer appears to be no. We have found little support 
for Nash equilibrium bidding behavior (in the expected value sense). Specifically, there are no Nash 
equilibria in any of the 20 allocations of AUSM and only four of 20 allocations in AUSM with 
TABLE 13 












1 (9.4, 8 .9) 
2 (8.5, 9.9) 
3 (7.7, 8.3) 
4 (6.9, 6.8) 
5 (8. 1 , 8 .7) 
TABLE 14 
Nash Configuration 
y Bid Market 
9 220 1 
9 145 1 
12 55 2 







queue. This result might be explained by risk averse behavior on the part of subjects in our 
experiments. 
Let us consider a weaker condition of Nash equilibrium behavior. We call (x;*, y;*, p;*) 
i = 1, . . . , n an e-Nash Equilibrium if the response (xt, yt, Pt) is i 's best play given the final 
· if if F . * * * * * d * ' allocation <{C , b heK >t=l such that [V1 (xi , Yi ) - bj ]  e [0, e] , where (xi , Yi ) =  (0, 0) an bi = 0 is a I 
possible response. If the final allocation has no responses which could make an individual at least e 
better-off, then it would qualify as an e-Nash equilibrium. Figure 1 1  supplies the cumulative 
distribution of the Nash equilibria that occurred in our experiments. Notice that for any given e, AQ 
achieved a larger number of e-Nash allocations than A. Figure 10 provides the number of best 
responses per period in the experiments, and Figure 12 shows the distribution of e-Nash responses. 
Do the non-Nash responses come from individuals already in a market or from those not yet 
in a market? The answer is that individuals in market 1 are almost always (58 out of 59) best 
responding. Only 27% (15/56) of the non-Nash responses come from subjects in market 2 for A and 
33% (1 1/33) in AQ. These facts suggest subjects may be "standing pat" in market 2. However, most 
of the non-Nash responses are from subjects who are not yet allocated space in a market. Further, 
the non-Nash responses are subject specific, with 50% of the subjects supplying 71  % of the non­
Nash responses in A and 79% inAQ. This may support a hypothesis that some individuals are risk 
averse. 
The main purpose of these experiments was not to test Nash behavior, but some aspects of 
the experiment design became clear in calculating such responses. For example, Table 14 provides a 
Nash equilibrium that yields one of the highest efficiency (88%) allocations without coalitions. The 
bids represent the lowest bids that maintain these as a Nash equilibrium. Notice that the expected 
profit is rather low for these participants. This demonstrates the sensitivity of the efficiency levels to 
the parameters we chose. 
Iterative Groves. In terms of individual behavior we can ask two pertinent questions about the data. 
(1) Did individuals bid their expected value (demand revealing) or less (for risk· 
aversion)? 
(2) Were there any discemable "strategic" bids made during a market period? 
The answer to the first question is rather interesting in that many of the bids made during a 
market period were above expected values (40% of the bids) and this was even true on the last trial 
in a period (31 % of the bids). This behavior did lead some individuals employing those bids to pay 
more than their value to get a contract. Those making such a loss (or after obtaining prices above 
expected values) generally did not repeat this bidding behavior. Figures 13 and 14 provide a 
histogram of the deviation of the winning bids from their expected value for each of our 
mechanisms. These distributions suggest "overbidding" in JG but "underbidding" in AUSM. Both 
of these results have implications for the efficiency of our mechanisms. 
Two particular aspects of strategic behavior employed by subjects involved attempts to gain 
information about other individuals bidding behavior. First some participants would not participate 
in any market (a bid of 0) to see what their price would be and have no effect on the prices of 
individuals who were provisionally selected. Second, the participants typically used all of the 
possible trials, implying that the resources would be allocated in a one-shot game in the final trial. 
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(85 % of the time for market 1 and 75% of the time for market 2.) Figures 6 and 7 show that JG does 
poorly in utilizing the capacity of the system. In order to see if the number of trials makes a 
difference in the efficiency of the mechanism, .  we conducted an experiment with 40 trials. For the 
first period the efficiency was 75.5% and revenue was 250; the second period concluded with 78% 
efficiency and 495 for revenue. Both periods used all 40 trials. 
F. Summary of Results 
We have found that expected efficiency can be improved significantly, over the random 
allocation from first-come-first-served processes, by well-designed mechanisms. However, the 
mechanisms we developed do not produce outcomes near the 100% level. The reason for this 
phenomenon comes from three separate aspects of our experiment. 
(1) Individual behavior in the AUSM mechanism reflects risk aversion. Our measures 
assume risk neutrality, but individual deviations from risk neutral behavior can have significant 
effects on expected efficiency. A better measure might account for those risk attitudes. This is 
particularly true given the small number of participants in our experiments. 
(2) Our experiment design requires coalitions to form and cohere to secure space. We have 
combined a "tough" fitting problem oflumpy demands along with a problem of allocating priority. 
Our mechanisms have done well in finding the coalitions but they have not fared well in maintaining 
them to the final allocations. 
(3) While the Iterative Groves mechanism is more efficient than the Random mechanism it 
does not produce 100% levels of efficiency. This result is in part due to the overbidding of 
participants. Furthermore, JG does not produce stable levels of efficiency. Superficially, this 
instability can be traced to the fact that the process was pushed to the final trial in many cases and 
thus the final bid was somewhat random. 
Some other observations follow. The Random mechanism has a significant learning 
component with individuals scaling down projects so as to fit. There is little support for learning in 
our other mechanisms. Revenues were relatively high and stable for AUSM with significantly 
higher revenue when a queue is added. JG exhibits extremely volatile revenues especially in market 
2. 
However, the most important result of the experiments was the implementation of new and 
sophisticated processes to allocate multidimensional and uncertain outputs. These results give us 
confidence in our ability to establish procedures to successfully modify these mechanisms for more 
friendly (and hostile) environments. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have designed and analyzed two different mechanisms for solving a 
resource allocation problem in an environment similar in many respects to that of the space station. 
The two key characteristics of the environment are that i) demands are lumpy and ill-fitting and ii) 
supply is uncertain at the time of contracting. Both of the proposed mechanisms performed 
reasonably well in allocating resources, though neither could consistently generate efficiencies 
greater than 85%. 
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In terms of future research, we can imagine a number of different approaches to the 
environment, contracts, and mechanisms described above. Two features of the environment are 
immediate candidates for modification. In Figure 3 the possible configurations which generate 
efficiencies greater than 85% are few and far between, and hence are quite sensitive to the decisions 
of any one participant. Conversely, Figure 3 also indicates why it is relatively easy to achieve 
efficiencies between 60% and 70%. Thus, from a theoretical point of view, it would be preferable to 
have a more level "playing field,"  a fairer testbed, upon which to judge the acceptability of a 
particular mechanism. 
A second modification to the environment would increase realism by allowing the 
preferences of some or all of the users to be a function of the time at which they are allocated 
resources. This would model better the importance of "launch windows" in Section III and the 
timing in Figure 2. Adding the time dimension to user preferences would also highlight the need for 
an analysis of contingent and futures contracting in allocating resources in contrast to our 
concentration on priority contracting. This then would allow for the comparison of mechanisms 
across contract types, as well as contract types across mechanisms. 
A third change in the environment would alter the subjects ' problems to correspond more 
closely to that of a NASA engineer. In particular, the payload selection process (including 
budgeting, peer review, and project management) might be better modeled with budget constraints 
on designs and payoffs for scientific benefits rather than net benefits as modeled in this paper.25 
One change in the existing mechanisms which may lead to greater efficiencies would be to 
permit the users to explicitly collude in their design choices and bidding behavior. Current policies 
discussed in Section III with regard to Spacelab pricing have as a criterion the compatibility of a set 
of projects; hence the ability of users to design and promote their projects in concert seems to be a 
realistic consideration. Another change might be to allow separate pricing and contracting in each 
resource, although the lumpiness of the demands might lead to coordination difficulties. 
The fundamental open question is, of course, whether or not there exist other allocation 
mechanisms which "do better" than those analyzed above. We leave this for others to ponder. 
22 
FOOTNOTES 
* We would like to acknowledge the computer programming assistance of Peter Gray and Mark 
Olson. We would like to thank Bob Benson of NASA (Payload Engineering) for his patience in 
answering our many questions concerning Spacelab allocation procedures. Financial assistance 
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1 .  We also detail a third mechanism which we used as a baseline in our evaluations. It can be 
thought of as a reasonable approximation of past NASA policy for resource allocation on the 
Space Shuttle and as such represents a lower bound on performance that any new mechanism 
must surpass.  
2.  In the language of technology development, we are beyond the initial concept and breadboard 
analysis but are not yet to the complete prototype stage, although we are currently moving our 
efforts in that direction. 
3 .  For those interested in a detailed description of the space station economic environment and the 
history of other related NASA programs, see Banks et al [ 1986] . 
4. We will also be providing remarks concerning NASA's Spacelab program since it is the closest 
analogy to the proposed space station. Spacelab is a module and/or pallet configuration that fits 
in the Shuttle bay and provides a short duration (seven days) shirt-sleeve laboratory 
environment in low-earth orbit. 
5. Other possible goals are discussed in Ledyard [ 1986]. 
6. There is an extensive literature on algorithms to solve "knapsack problems", which is somewhat 
related to our problem. We do not survey it here. The interested reader is referred to French 
[1982] . 
7. The initial problem of the airport landing slot allocation was investigated by Grether, Isaac, and 
Plott [1979, 1981] .  Their solution relies heavily on the use of after markets to rearrange slot 
allocations and drive the system to an efficient allocation. 
8.  A typical (and obviously faulty) solution offered up by "engineers" to handle the output 
uncertainty and payload requirement changes for Spacelab and space station is the use of 
management resource reserves. 
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9. We will also provide footnotes describing the extension for more general contingent contracting 
in this environment. 
10. Two generalizations could easily have been accommodated, but would have added little to the 
design challenge. First, one could have included a variable supply reliability in which either 
y1 ,y2, . . . , or y<Kl would be supplied with probability IIi. (ti) , . . .  , IIKci)· Second, one could 
have allowed the probabilities at t 2 to be conditional on the outcome at t 1 • 
1 1 . We index projects by the resources they use rather than a production function. A more detailed 
model would let a.i e Ai be the index of i 's projects, zi = f (di . a.i ) be the output of project ai if 
resources di e R k are used, and Wi (zi , bi ) be i 's utility function for zi and payment bi . For 
each di , let ui (di , bi ) = max Wi (zi , bi ) subject to zi = f (di , ai ) and CXj e Ai . 
12. A contingent contract is a triple (E , di , bi ), where E � S is the event in which di must be 
delivered and bi is paid whether E occurs or not. Notice that priority contracts are special 
contingent contracts. There are others. For the example in Figure 2, the contingent contract 
(3, di , bi ) implies i receives (di , d�) if state 3 occurs. Feasibility implies df = 0 since y 1(3) = 0. 
A contract ({1, 2}, (di , 0), bi ) will give i an amount di in period 1 if and only if y1 is supplied in 
period 1 .  The simplest complete set of contingent contracts is { (s , di , bi )s e S } ,  which is the , 
standard Arrow-Debreu set of contingent markets. This set is complete in the sense that all 
achievable consumption plans can be attained through some combination of these contracts. 
For example, i can insure consumption of di in period 2 of Figure 2, if it is available, by 
contracting for (1, di , bi ) and (3, di , b � )  where d = (O, di). 
13 .  The model can be easily adapted to risk-averse suppliers and to contracts in which bi is  paid 
only if delivery occurs. We leave this exercise to the interested reader. 
14. For contingent contracts we would have three markets which correspond to all the non-zero 
states in Figure 2. That is, market 1 would correspond to g in period 1; market 2 for g in both 
periods; and market 3 for g in period 2 only. Combinations of contracts in market 1 and 3 and 
market 2 and 3 are feasible with contingent contracts. 
15.  With a set of contingent contracts, the sequence of events in the tree structure of Figure 2 is 
explicitly recognized. For this baseline mechanism, the three outcomes (g , g ), (g , n )  and (n , g )  
are to be allocated randomly. Participants were asked to submit an order with an x and y 
configuration along with a preference ranking over the five consistent portfolios (g , g ), (g , n )  
and (n , g )  and { (g , n )  and (n , g  )}, { (g , g )  and (n , g )} .  These markets were labeled (1), (2), (3), 
(1 and 3), and (2 and 3) respectively. The orders were then collected and randomly selected one 
at a time and placed in the first available market with available capacity according to the 
ranking on the order fonn. When all the capacity or orders were exhausted, a die was rolled 
twice. If the numbers 1 through 4 appeared on the first roll, the orders in market 1 ,  and market 
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1 and 3 would be filled. If the numbers 1 through 4 appeared on the first roll and 1 through 3 
appeared on the second roll, the orders in market 2, and market 2 and 3 would be filled. If the 
numbers 5 or 6 appeared on the first roll and the numbers 1 through 3 appeared on the second 
roll, the orders in market 3, and market 2 and 3 would be filled. If a participant's  order was 
filled, he/she would receive the value associated with the configuration ordered. 
16. A fixed fee could have been levied which we do not think would have affected offered 
proposals, but could possibly have affected participation. 
17. The plausibility of this can be seen by assuming that di can be chosen continuously. An agent 
facing the random mechanism will choose di to maximize ei (d ,f )u; (di , 0). That is, if d*i is i 's  
choice then d*i satisfies 
On the other hand the project with the largest payoff, Ji , satisfies [aui (Ji , O)tadi ]  = 0. Since 
aei tadi < 0 it follows that [aui (d*i , O)/adi ]  > [aui (Ji , O)/adi ] .  Therefore, d*i < Ji .  (Note that this 
is true in all dimensions of di .) 
18 .  There are two plausibility arguments one can use to support the remark that users confronted 
with the random mechanism will choose inefficiently sized projects. First, suppose that one 
could omnisciently and simultaneously pick the size of all projects (di , . . .  , dN) to maximize the 
expected benefits of using the random mechanism, .I:i ei (d ,f )u i (di , 0). The choices, d** would 
satisfy the N equations: 
[aei (d** .n1adj]uj (d**j , O) + ei (d** ,f )[auj (d**j , 0)1adj] = 
-zb•j [aek (d** ,f )tadj ]uk [d**j , OJ. 
On the other hand, users selecting di independently will choose d*i so that the left hand side of 
these equations are zero. Further, it seems likely that if d**j is small then aek(d** ,f )tadj < O 
and if d**j is large then aek(d** ,/ )!adj > 0. The fonner because small projects are likely to fit 
in and, if they do, the bigger they are the less room they leave for others. The latter because 
large projects are less likely to fit in and the bigger they are the less likely it is, leaving more 
room for others. Therefore if d**j is small then a[ei (d0 ,f )uj (d** j ,  O)]/adj < 
a[ej [d* ,f ]  · ui (d*j , O)]ladj . If, in the move from d** to d* , ei (d ,f)  behaves reasonably then 
this implies that d*i > d**j . That is, the agent chooses a project size larger than that one would 
choose to maximize aggregate benefits. If d**i is large, the opposite conclusion holds. The 
second plausibility argument is not conclusive since it rests on some shaky calculations; but it is 
suggestive. We provide the calculation for participant 1 .  Suppose that if the small project, 
(x ,y) = (4,3), is chosen then it fits in market 1 if selected first, second or third and in market 2 if 
selected first through fifth. Then e = � p1 + � p2 = � . Suppose if the large project, 
(x , y )  = (12, 13) is chosen it fits in 1 if chosen first and in 2 if chosen 2nd or 3rd. Then 
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e = ! p1 + · � p2 = ! . Finally suppose for the medium size, (x , y )  = (7, 9), e = � p1 + � p2 = � .  
Under these assumptions the project that maximizes e · u is the medium size where eu = 75. A 
similar calculation works for all participants. 
19. Of course, if enough contingent bids could be submitted in a sealed-bid, it could mimic an 
iterative process, but in an informationally more complex manner. 
20. If omitted users could replace just the marginal units of those users in the potential allocation, 
then it would not be costly to "bump" part of a large user. To do this, however, users would 
have to be allowed to express a bid for each unit they wish to buy, yielding an entirely different 
mechanism. 
21 .  For contingent contracts: 
a) Three markets are employed in accordance with the tree structure found in Figure 2. 
Orders could be submitted for markets l ,  2, or 3 separately or the market combinations (1 
and 3), and (2 and 3). Subjects could not have orders simultaneously in markets 1 and 2. 
The last order submitted by a subject replaced all existing orders of the subject. Finally, if 
a subject had orders in two markets the orders had to have the same configuration. 
b) The costs in a market period for a subject was the sum of his bids for each market where he 
has orders at the market close. Earnings for a market period would be equal to the 
redemption value of the orders filled minus costs. 
22. Given that the environment we are investigating involves the allocation of an uncertain supply, 
questions concerning risk attitudes naturally arise. In particular, subjects will be obtaining 
queue positions and paying money for outputs which are random. They are buying lotteries. 
We have chosen not to attempt to control for risk attitudes in testing the mechanisms for two 
reasons. First, in practice users of space station will have varied risk attitudes and mechanisms 
must perform well in that situation. Second, techniques to induce or control for risk attitudes in 
the laboratory may provide assistance for tests with specific risk preference contours (see Berg, 
et. al, [ 1986] and Roth and Malouf [1979]); however, given the results from Cox, Smith, and 
Walker [ 1985], we are dubious of the use of such techniques for controlling subject-risk 
attitudes in mechanism design experiments. 
23. The Table below provides the descriptive statistics for the treatment of contingent contracts 
across mechanisms (except for AUSM with queue and Iterative Groves). The main aspect of 
these data to notice is that the introduction of these contracts does not improve efficiency (see 
Figures 5 and 6 in Appendix D). 
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Efficiency by Mechanism-Contingent Contracts 
Mechanism µ <1 v Range 
Random 63 9 . 14 [48, 73] 
AUSM 78 3 .04 [73, 8 1] 
24. The table below supplies the descriptive statistics for the revenue generated by contingent 
contracts in AUSM without a queue. We note that these preliminary data suggest that the use 
of contingent contracts generates more revenue. In addition, while market 1 has a relatively 
stable revenue component, markets 2 and 3 exhibit a higher variation in their revenue patterns. 
Revenue 
Market µ <1 v Range 
Market 1 273 33 . 12 [215, 3 15] 
Market 2 137 30 .22 [90, 175] 
Market 3 82 23 .28 [55, 125] 
Total Revenue 492 70 . 14 [390, 585] 
25. We would change the model in footnote 1 1  as follows: Let Bi be i 's budget as determined by 
NASA and Congress and Wi (zi) be the utility for the scientific returns zi and let c i (d; , ai ) be 
the cost of design and construction of project (di , ai ). Now let ui (di , B i - bi ) = MAX Wi (Zi ) 
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REDEMPTION VALUE SHEETS AND SCREEN DISPLAY 
Valuat ion Sheet 1 Valuation Sheet 2 
I y 3 9 1 3  I y 6 10 14 
I X  I X  
I I 
I 4 100 150 175 I 3 1 2 5  1 5 0  1 7 5  
I I 
I I 
I 7 1 7 5  2 2 5  2 5 0  I 9 1 7 5  1 9 0  200 
I I 
I I 
I 12 250 325  3 3 5  I 1 5  200 2 2 5  2 50 
I I 
Valuat ion Sheet 3 Valuation Sheet 4 
I y 2 4 9 I y 8 10 12 
I X  I X  
I I 
I 3 7 5  100 125  I 6 100 150 200 
I I 
I I 
I 5 100 200 225 I 8 150 200 275  
I I 
I I 
I 12 1 7 5  250 2 7 5  I 1 2  1 7 5  250 300 
I I 
Valuat ion Sheet 5 Valuation Sheet 6 
I y 7 10 13 I y 7 9 1 1  
I X  I X  
I I 
I 6 1 7 5  2 2 5  250 I 7 7 5  150 175  
I I 
I I 
I 9 2 2 5  2 7 5  300 I 9 1 2 5  175  200 
I I 
I I 










Exc e s s  4 
I TERAT I VE GROVES S CREEN D I SPLAY 
FOR BUYER 2 
TR I AL 1 MARKET 2 TRI AL 1 
y BUYER 
1 0 - 6 
6 I- 2 
P 1 = 20 0  b1 = 20 
TR I AL 2 MARKET 2 
y BUYER 
1 0  .. 6 
6 ... 2 




8 1 2  -
P l = lO 
T R I AL 2 
x y 
6 6 -
8 1 2  . 
P2 = 1 0  
6 2 





( Th i s  port ion i s  the s ame for all mechanisms } 
You are about to partic ipate in an exper iment des igned to p rovide 
ins i ght into cer tain feature s  of dec i s ion proce s s e s . If you fo l l ow the 
ins truc t i ons carefully and make good de c i s ions , you might earn a cons iderable 
amount o f  money . You w i l l  be paid in cash . 
In thi s  exp er iment we are go ing to conduct a marke t in wh i ch you wi l l  
make dec i s ions wh ich w i l l  be us ed t o  de termine the market outcome s . You will 
b e  g iven a Redemp t ion Value Shee t , wh i ch de s c r ib e s  the value to you o f  the 
de c i s i ons you might make . You are no t to reveal th i s  information to anyone . 
I t  i s  your own pr ivate informat ion . 
The type of currency us ed in thi s  market is francs . Al l trans ac t i ons 
wi l l  be in terms of franc s . Each franc i s  worth ___ do l l ars to you . Do no t 
reveal thi s  numbe r  to anyone . At the end of the exper iment your francs will 
be c onverted into do l lars at thi s  rate , and you will be paid in dollars . 
On your Redemption Value Sheet you have one proj e c t  wh ich has 9 po s s ib l e  
X and Y c onfigurat ions a s s o c iated with i t  along with a redemp t ion value 
s tated in franc s . Suppo s e  for examp le that your Redemp t i on Value Sheet were 
as fo l l ows : 
I Y I  3 6 1 2  
l _X_ I 
I I 
I 5 I 100 200 3 0 0  
I I 
I I 
I 1 0  I 200 400 5 0 0  
I I 
I I 
I 1 5  I 300 450 5 5 0  
I I 
Then for your proj e c t  with the confi guration X=5 and Y=l 2 , you would have 
a redemp t ion value of 3 0 0  franc s ; for your proj ect with configuration X=lO 
and Y=6 you would have a redemption value o f  400 franc s . 
W i thin e ach marke t period there w i l l  be a to tal of __ markets with a 
fixed c ap ac i ty o f  2 0  uni t s  of X and 20 units o f  Y in each marke t to be 
a l located to p ar t i c ip ants . Your amount o f  X and Y and the earnings you wi l l  
rece ive w i l l  b e  determined us ing the fo l l owing proces s . 
( For the I terative Groves mechanism we us e d }  
Al l c ommunication during the market period w i l l  conduc ted through your 
c omputer terminal . The experiment will c ons i s t  of s everal market per iods . 
Each marke t period will be composed of tr ials in wh ich you will submit an 
orde r . An o rder c ons i s ts o f  a configura t i on , a marke t ,  and a b i d  for the 
marke t .  You c an submit an o rder dur ing a trial by fo l l owing the ins truc t i on 
p romp t s  on your c omputer s creen . The firs t promp t will ask you for a 
c onf i guration o f  X and Y .  You mus t  then enter one of your 9 cho i c e s . Next you 
will be asked i f  you want to enter a b id for market l ;  if you answer ye s ( y ) , 
you w i l l  be asked for your b i d  in franc s . I f  you answer no ( n) , i t  will 
proceed to market 2 and ask you i f  you would l ike to b id .  Thus , for a trial 
in a marke t period you c anno t s imul taneous ly have a b i d  in marke ts 1 and 2 .  
EXAMPLE 
Enter quantity of X de s ired : l 
Enter quantity o f  Y des ired : 1 2  
Do you want t o  o rder i n  market l ?  n 
Do you want to order in marke t 2 ?  y 
Enter b i d  in marke t 2 :  1 5 0  
Do you c onfirm X = 7 Y = 1 2  B l  = 0 B 2  = 1 5 0  ? y 
Thus , in thi s  examp l e  a b id of 1 5 0  francs was p l aced in market 2 fo r the 
c onfiguration X-7 and Y=l 2 . The only r e s t r i c t i on you have on the b i ds you 
submi t  for a marke t during a per iod is that it be greater than or equal to 
z ero . After each partic ipant has p laced an order dur ing a trial , a s e t  o f  
provi s i onal c onfigurat ions will b e  s e l e c t e d  for each market by finding the 
large s t  sum of b ids subm i tted for that market for whi ch the sum of the 
corresponding c onfigurat ions do not exceed the c apac i ty cons traints (X 2 0 , 
Y = 2 0 ) . Each individual will then be g iven the information as to wh i ch 
p ar t i c i p ants are provis ionally s e lected in each marke t and the i r  
c onfigurations . In addi t i on , each partic ipant will rece ive a price f o r  e ach 
marke t .  I f  you are one of the partic ipants that are provis i onally s e lected in 
a marke t ,  your p r i c e  will be c al culated as fol lows : 
[ Maximum o f  the sum o f  b ids (without your b id )  submitted for that market for 
whi ch the corresponding to tal configurations (wi thout your configuration) 
do e s  no t violate the c ap ac i ty cons traint ] -
( Sum o f  b ids ( exc luding your b i d )  of the p rovi s i onal c onfigurat i ons ] 
I f  your c onf i gurat ion is no t one o f  the provis ional c onf i gurations in a 
marke t ,  then you w i l l  r e c e ive a price whi ch indicates the minimum b id you 
could have submi tted in that market and have had your o rder be one of the 
provi s i onal conf i gurations in that marke t .  
EXAMPLE 
Marke t 2 
Partic ipant K y B i d  Price 
*l 10 10 2 0 0  1 6 0  
2 1 5  1 0  1 6 0  2 0 0  
3 1 0  1 5  1 7 0  3 5 0  
*4 5 1 0  1 5 0  0 
6 1 1  5 1 0 0  2 0 0  
I n  th i s  examp l e , w e  s e e  that partic ipants 1 and 4 have p rovis ional 
configurat i ons in thi s  market b e c aus e the i r  c omb ined reque s t s  of X=l 5  and 
Y=2 0  do no t violate the c ap ac i ty cons traint s , and the i r  sum o f  b i ds o f  3 5 0  
franc s i s  the large s t  such sum . The p r i c e  for partic ipant 1 was calculated 
by : ( 3 1 0 ] - ( 1 5 0 ] = 160 as per the equation above . S imilar ly , the price for 
p ar t i c i p ant 4 was c al culated by : ( 2 0 0 ] - [ 2 0 0 ] = 0 .  Notice that in e i ther 
cas e the price doe s  no t depend on the partic ipant ' s  b id .  
For an individual who is not in the provi s ional configuration in th i s  
examp l e , such a s  partic ipant 3 ,  we s e e  that to be i n  the pr ovis ional s e t  
he/she mus t  b i d  3 5 0  francs s ince the configuration he/she submi tted c anno t 
f i t  wi th any o ther order . 
The provis ional configurat ions in the marke ts will ob tain their 
a l l o cat ions i f  the s ame partic ipants and configurat i ons oc cur for �­
s traigh t  trials ( Rule A ) , or the trials in the marke t period are exhaus ted . 
A total o f  �- trials for each marke t per iod will be al lowed . Market 1 w i l l  
c l o s e  after trials , and market 2 after addi t i onal trial s . That i s , 
i f  Rul e A i s  no t activated after �- trials the provis ional allocat ions in 
marke t 1 will be cho sen , and after trials the orders in market 2 w i l l  be 
cho s en . After the process s tops in a period by e i ther of the condi tions a die 
will b e  rolled . If the numbers ��- through �� app ear the orders in marke t 
1 w i l l  be f i l l ed . I f  the numbers ��- through �� appear the orders in 
marke t 2 will be f i l l ed . 
Each partic ipant has been given ��- francs o f  working cap i tal . To 
determ ine your c o s t s  for the marke t p e r i o d , sum up your p r i c e s  in tho s e  
marke t s  for which you have obtained an allocat ion a t  the market c l o s e . I f  
your o rder i s  fil l e d , then your earnings will b e  equal to your redemp t ion 
value minus your c o s ts . I f  your order i s  not fil led , you mus t  sub tract your 
c o s ts from your working cap i tal . If you do not obtain an allo cation in a 
marke t for the period , you will rece ive z e ro earnings for the period . You 
should record your e arnings on your Record of Earnings she e t  l o cated in the 
b ack o f  your folder . At the beginning of a market period you will be 
a s s igned a new Redemp t ion Value She e t  from which to make your dec i s ions . The 
Redemp t i on Value She e t  will not be the s ame for all partic ipants . Feel free 
to e arn as much as you can . Are the re any que s t ions ? 
{ Fo r  the ASUM - Bulletin Board with Queue we us ed } 
When the market opens you will b e  ab l e  to submit an o rder cons i s t ing o f  
a market or the S tandby Queue , a conf igurat ion , and a b id i n  franc s . Orders 
w i l l  be taken one at a t ime and posted on the board . You can submit an o rder 
by r a i s ing your hand and after you are ident ifie d ,  you can submi t one order . 
Your o rder wi l l  be accepted i f :  
a )  I t  c an fit in the availab le c ap ac i ty o f  the market 
reque s te d , or 
b )  It c an disp lace exi s t ing orders with lowe r b i ds , or 
c )  The S tandby Queue is reque s ted . 
I f  p l ac e  an o rder in the S tandby Queue you mus t also ident ify the marke t 
for wh i ch the order i s  to be placed on s tandby . However ,  you c an have only 
one o rder in the marke ts at any one t ime . Thus , you c an have an order in 
Marke t 1 or 2 but not both Marke ts 1 and 2 s imultaneous ly . You can have as 
many o r ders as you want in the S tandby Queue . 
S upp o s e  for examp l e , that the fixed capac i ty was X = 2 0  and Y = 2 0 , and 
the re we re 2 marke t s , and the exi s t ing orders , none o f  whi ch are yours , were 
as fo l l ows : 
Available 
Capac ity 
Market 1 Market 2 S tandby Queue 
x y B i d  x y B i d  x y B i d  Marke t 
1 1  9 1100 7 5 5 0 0  5 5 400 1 
5 . 7 1000 
4 4 1 3  1 5  
I f  you want t o  submi t an order that has quant i t i e s  X = 4 and Y = 6 ,  you 
c an order s p ace in Market 2 or the S tandby Queue and submit any nonne gat ive 
b id ,  or you c an o rder space in Market 1 and di splace the X = 5 and Y = 7 
order w i th a b i d  greater than 1000 franc s . Furthermore you c an c omb ine your 
b i ds w i th o rders in the S tandby Queue that were not submi tted by you to 
displac e  exi s t ing o rders in Marke ts 1 and 2 if the ent ire order c an fit and 
the total b i d  i s  greater than the total displaced orders b i ds . For example , 
you c ould have made a b id greater than 6 0 0  francs and c omb ined that with the 
exi s t ing 4 0 0  franc b i d  in the S tandby Queue and displace the X = 5 and Y = 7 
order in Market 1 s ince you b o th c an f i t . In the event that more than one 
ex i s t ing o rder c an be displaced by your b id the order with the l owe s t  b i d  
w i l l  b e  the one displaced . I f  one o f  your o rders in the S tandby Queue i s  
comb ined wi th ano ther orde r , then any o rder you have s tanding in a market i s  
c anc e l e d . 
I f  you have an o rder in a marke t you c an change it only i f  you increase 
your b i d . I f  you increase your bid you c an : 
a) Move your configurat ion to ano the r  marke t i f  you c an fit or disp lace 
orders w i th l ower b ids and/o r  
b )  Change your c onfiguration i f  i t  fits . However , i f  you d o  n o t  move 
your configuration to ano ther marke t you mus t  p l ace a b i d  h i gher than the 
orders you are disp l ac ing inc luding your S tanding Order . 
Your b i d  change mus t b e  greater than francs to be accepte d .  Once 
you have an o rder in a marke t you c annot wi thdraw i t . Howeve r ,  you can 
withdraw o rders from the s tandby queue . 
In the event that your o rder i s  displac e d  you can reorder through the 
p r o c e s s  de s c r ibed above . The pro c e s s  will s top when there are no new orders 
o r  order changes ( increased b ids ) within seconds o f  the last order 
subm i t te d .  The o rder s  left s tanding on the board in Markets 1 and 2 when the 
proce s s  s to p s  are the only o rders that c an be f i l led . However ,  there is a 
chance that the orders at the marke t c l o s e  w i l l  not be f i l l e d . After the 
proc e s s  s to p s  a die will be roll ed . The o rders in Market 1 will be filled i f  
any o f  the numbers ��- through appear . The o rder s  in Market 2 will 
be f i l l e d  i f  any o f  the numbe r s  through appear . 
Each partic ipant has b een given francs of working c ap i tal . I f  
your order i s  filled your e arnings w i l l  be e qual t o  your redemp t i on value 
minus your b id . I f  your order is not accep ted you mus t sub tract your b i d from 
your working c ap i tal . If you did not get in a market you w i l l  receive zero 
earnings for the marke t per i o d . You should record your e arnings on your 
Record o f  Earnings Shee t  located in the b ack o f  your folde r . Your earnings 
plus your remaining working c ap i tal are yours to keep . At the beginning of a 
marke t p e r i o d  you wi l l  be a s s i gned a new Redemp t i on Value Sheet from which to 
make your dec i s i ons . The Redemp t i on Value She e t  will not be the s ame for all 
par t i c i p ant s . Feel free t o  e arn as much as you c an .  Are there any que s tions ? 
{ For the AUSM - Bulletin Board we used ) 
When the market opens you will be ab le to submi t an order cons i s t ing o f  
a marke t ,  a confi gurat ion , and a b i d  i n  franc s . Orders wi l l  be taken one at 
a t ime and pos ted on the board . You c an submi t  an order by rais ing your hand 
and after you are ident i fied , you can submit one order . Your order wi l l  be 
accep ted i f :  
a )  I t  can fit i n  the availab l e  capac i ty o f  the marke t 
reque s te d , or 
b) It can disp lace exi s t ing orders with lower b i ds . 
Howeve r ,  you c an only have one order s tanding on the bo ard at any one t ime . 
Thus you can have an o rder in Market 1 or 2 but both Marke ts 1 and 2 
s imultaneous ly . 
For examp l e , suppo s e  the fixed c ap ac i ty was X = 2 0  and Y 2 0 , and 
ther e  were two marke t s , and the exi s t ing orders none o f  wh ich are yours we re 
as fo l l ows : 
Market 1 Marke t 2 
x y Bid x y Bid 
1 0  9 1 100 7 5 500 
5 7 1000 
Ava i l ab le 4 4 1 3  1 5  
Capac i ty 
I f  you want to submit an order that has quant i t i e s  X = 4 and Y = 6 you 
can e i ther order space in Market 2 and submit any nonne gat ive b i d ,  or you 
c an order space in Market 1 and displac e  the X = 5 ,  Y = 7 order with a b i d 
greater than 1 0 0 0  franc s . In the event that more than one exi s t ing order c an 
be disp laced by your b id the order w i th the lowe s t  b i d  will be the one 
displac e d . 
I f  you have an order s tanding on the board you can change it only if 
you inc rease your b id .  If you increase your b i d you can : 
a )  Move your c onfigurat ion to another market i f  you c an fit 
and/or 
b )  Change your c onfigurat ion i f  it fits . Howeve r ,  if you do not move 
your c onfiguration to another marke t you mus t p lace a b i d higher than than 
the o r ders you are disp lac ing including your s tanding orde r . Your b i d  change 
mus t  be greater than franc s to be accep ted . Once you have an o rder in 
a marke t you canno t wi thdraw i t .  
I n  the event that your o rder i s  disp laced you can reorder through the 
p ro c e s s  de s cribed above . The proce s s  wi l l  s top when there are no new o rders 
o r  order change s  ( increased b ids ) w i thin s econds o f  the las t o rder 
submitted . The o rders l e ft s tanding on the board in Marke ts 1 and 2 when the 
proc e s s  s tops are the only orders that can be filled . However ,  there i s  a 
chance that the orders at the market c l o s e  wi l l  not be filled . After the 
proce s s  s tops a die will be rolle d .  The orders in Market 1 will be f i l l ed if 
any o f  the numbers ��- through appear . The orders in Market 2 will 
b e  f i l l ed i f  any o f  the numbers through appear . 
Each partic ipant has been given franc s of working cap i tal . I f  
your o r der i s  f i l l e d  your e arnings w i l l  be e qual t o  your redemp t i on value 
minus your bid . I f  your order is no t ac cepted you mus t  sub trac t your b i d  from 
your working c ap i tal . I f  you did no t get in a market you wi l l  rece ive zero 
e arnings for the market period . You should record your earnings on your 
Rec o rd o f  Earnings Sheet located in the b ack o f  your fo lder . Your e arnings 
p lus your remaining working cap i tal are yours to keep . 
At the b e ginning o f  a marke t period you w i l l  be as s i gned a new 
Redemp t ion Value She et from wh i ch to make your de c i s ions . The redemption 
value sheet wi l l  no t be the s ame for all partic ipants . Feel free to earn as 
much as you c an . Are there any ques t i ons ? 
( For the Random Pro c e s s  we us e d }  
At the b e ginning o f  the marke t per iod you w i l l  s end in your order for an 
X and Y configurat ion you would l ike by subm i t t ing an order form , and a 
ranking o f  your preferenc e s  for Marke ts 1 and 2 .  That i s , you canno t p l ace a 
prefe rence ranking for Marke ts 1 and 2 s imultaneous ly . Order forms can be 
found in the b ack o f  your fo l de r . To submi t an order j us t  p l ac e  your X and Y 
c onfigurat i on found on your Redemp t i on Value She e t  on your order form with a 
ranking o f  the markets . For example , suppo s e  you want to p lace an order for a 
c onf i guration on your redemp t ion value she e t  that quant i t i e s  o f  X = 9 and Y = 
14 , and you wanted the market r ankings 2 and 1 ,  then you would s end in an 




You c an s ubmi t  one orde r . 
After a l l  the o rders have b e en collecte d  we will randomly s e l e c t  the 
orde r s  and p l ace them in the firs t avai lab l e  marke t with c ap ac i ty availab l e  
according t o  the ranking on the o rder form as they a r e  drawn . After w e  have 
exhau s t e d  a l l  the orders or the c apac i ty in e ach market we w i l l  determine the 
o rde r s  that are fil led by r o l l ing a die twic e . I f  the numb ers through 
app e ar on the f i r s t  roll the o rders in Market 1 will be fi l l ed . I f  the 
numb e r s  through appear then the o rders in market 2 wi l l  be 
f i l l e d . 
Your e arnings fo r the market period wi l l  be e qual to your redemption 
value i f  your o rder i s  fil led , o therwi s e  your e arnings wi l l  be z ero . You 
should enter e arnings fo r the marke t period on your Record o f  Earnings She e t . 
Your to tal e arnings over all the market peri ods are yours to keep . 
At the b e g inning o f  a marke t period you w i l l  be as s i gned a new 
Redemp t i on Value She e t  from whi ch to make your dec i s i ons . The redemp t ion 
value s h e e t  w i l l  not be the s ame for all partic ipants . Fee l  free to earn as 
much a s  you c an . Are there any ques t i ons ? 
( For the Random Pro c e s s  with Cont ingent Contracts we us e d )  
At the b e g inning o f  the market period you w i l l  s end i n  your o rder for an 
X and Y configurat i on you would l ike by subm i t t ing an o rder form , and a 
ranking o f  your p re ference s  for Marke t s  1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  1 and 3 ,  and 2 and 3 .  That 
i s , you c anno t p l ace a prefe rence ranking for Marke ts 1 and 2 s imultaneous ly . 
Order forms c an be found in the b ack o f  your fo l de r . To submit an order j us t  
p l ac e your X and Y c onfiguration found o n  your Redempt i on Value Shee t  on your 
order form w i th a ranking of the marke t s . For examp l e , supp o s e  you want to 
p lace an o rder for a c onfigurat i on on your redemp t i on value she e t  that 
quant i t i e s  o f  X = 9 and Y = 14 , and you wanted the market rankings 2 and 3 ,  





You c an submi t  one order . 
After a l l  the o rde rs have been c o l le c ted we will randomly s e l e c t  the 
o rders and p l ace them in the f i r s t  avai lab l e  market with capac i ty avai l ab l e  
acc ording to the ranking o n  the o rder form as they are drawn . After w e  have 
exhaus ted all the orders or the capac i ty in each market we will determine the 
o rders that are filled by roll ing a die twice . I f  the numbers through 
appear on the first roll the orders in Market 1 will be f i l le d .  I f  the 
numbers ��- through ��- appear on the first roll and the numb ers 
through ��- appe ar on the s e cond roll the orders in Markets 1 and 2 will be 
f i l l e d . If the numbers through ��- appear on the firs t roll and the 
numbers 
w i l l  b e  
through ��- appear o n  the s econd roll the orders i n  Marke t 3 
fille d . 
Your e arnings for the market period will be equal to your re demp t ion 
value if your o rde r i s  fil led , o therwi s e  your e arnings will be zero . You 
should enter e arnings for the market period on your Record of Earnings Sheet . 
Your total e arnings over all the marke t per iods are yours to keep . 
At the beginning o f  a marke t period you wi l l  be as s igned a new 
Redemp t i on Value Sheet from whi ch to make your dec i s i ons . The redempt ion 
value she e t  will no t be the s ame for all partic ipants . Feel free to e arn as 
much a s  you c an .  Are there any que s tions ? 
Rev i ew Quiz C:. :t <il 
Suppoa• the following information for t r i al z in a market 
period was on your screen : 
Market 





I I 4 


























Pz - 10 
l .  I f  these same buyers and associated ( x , y) configurations were 
to be the s ame for the next trials would the process stop? 
What i f  trial z were trial �? 
2. I f  you are buyer 2 and you were to submit a bid of 200 francs 
in market l in the next trial for your configuration x - 8, y -
12 , w i l l  you get into market l? What will happen to your order in 
market 2 ?  
3 .  I f  the market closed with the orders i n  this example and the 
roll of the die were a 4 ,  what would be the earnings for buyer 5 
if his redemption value were 900 francs and his price were 200 
francs? What would be the earnings for buyer 6 if his redemption 
value were 900 francs and his price were 20 francs ?  
REVIEW QUIZ C A1 
Suppose the exis ting orders in the markets (none of which are 
yours ) were as follows : 
Market l 
x r w 
7 10 600 







x r w 
6 6 500 
8 12 400 
6 
1 .  If you wanted to submit an order with a configuration of X- 6 
and Y - 6 what is the lowest bid you could make and get into a 
market? 
2 .  If you wanted to submit a configuration of X - 8 and Y - 9 wha t  
is the lowest b i d  you could make and obtain a place in Market l ?  I n  
Market 2 ?  What happens t o  the displaced orders? 
3 .  If the X - 6 and Y - 6 configuration in Market 2 is your order 
and you have a possible X - 4 and Y - 4 configuration could you 
move your order to Market l? I f  10 what is the smallest b id you 
could make? 
4. If the market closed with the orders in this examp l e  and the 
roll of the die were a 4 what would be the earning• for the X - 9 
and Y - 6 configuration in Market l if its redemption value were 
900 franc s ?  What would be the earnings for the X - 6 and Y - 6 
configuration in Marke t 2 if its redemption value were 900 franc s ?  
REVIE\/ QUIZ [ !\ q 'J 
Suppose the exist ing orders in the marke ts (none of which are 
yours ) were as follows : 
Available 











S tandby Queue 
6 500 300 l 
12 400 4 200 2 
15 10 400 
2 
1 .  I f  you wanted to submit an order with a configuration of X-
and Y 6 what is the lowest bid you could make and get into a 
market? 
2. If you wanted to aubmit a configuration of X - 8 and Y - 9 what 
i s  the lowest bid you could make and obtain a place in Market l? In 
Market 2 ?  What happens to the displaced orders? 
3 .  If the X - 6 and Y - 6 configuration in Market 2 is your order 
and you have a possible X - 4 and Y - 4 configuration could you 
move your order to Market l? If so what is the smallest bid you 
could Make? 
4 .  If the market closed with the orders in this example and the 
roll of the die were a 4 what would be the earnings for the X - 9 
and Y - 6 configuration in Market 1 if i ts redemption value were 
900 franc s ?  What would be the earnings for the X - 6 and Y - 6 
configuration in Market 2 if its redemption value were 900 franc s ?  
What would b e  the earnings of the X - 3 and Y - configuration i n  
the S tandby Queue if i ts redemption value were 500 franc s ?  
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r i g.i re ' :  T ! �es Ser l as  of E f f i c i ency 
%UM w i th  0U81.Je ( P r i o r i  +.i.i Con lr•:1ds) 
100�-
--------------------.� l  " exp 1 o i:. exp 1 5  
�: I 
40 
�o.__ _ ___._ ___ _._ __ __.3...._ __ __._ ___ �s---� !! 
per i od 
F l gure l bT f �  Ser l es of Eft" J c f g-cy 






exp 8 .  Q exp 1 1  4 exp 1 4  
• exp 1 6  , ... - - - - - - - -.. �.!��- - 4- - -L­
s:�.- � -:.:--=�- -��/=·· .... � .... 
3:1L.-----'-----'-----'''-----"-'----'----� 0 2 3 4 6 
00 
pe r i od 
F l gure l1 T l rre  SE r l es  of E ff i c i ency 
IG { P r i or i ly Ccn l roc le) 
exp 1 8  Q e:x:p 1 g i:. exp 20 
c exp4Z I ./"� 
ao 
� 70 di 
0 '·\ =--___,.,,,,.- , ,a . .  � \',/· ' • . . A _ , , •  • , ,  .. " .. .. ....... � .c..; "' 
, .. ' 
.. 
\ ..  ,;"C - - -::e:-.. ":':-.. -;..:�� C'/' \ Q- • •  , · :-" · • O· · · · · ' "  
/ \ J 
40 
\ , /  
\ / 6. 
:)) '-- ---'----�·----'----..._, __ _.. ___ � 
0 2 3 4 
per i od 
00 
r l gure lT l me  Ser l asa  of E f f l c l er,q,; 
Rand:im �ch:iti i em  ( Pr i or i ty Coo f roc 1.e \ 
e:<p 
c exp 1 2  
o exp 2 
.. exp 1 3  
� exp 7 
� ,0 ill I 
r:J 
- 00 � 
60 
40 
JJ 0 3 
per i od 
4 IS 
F i gure I �  T l rre  Ser l es  of Eff i c i ency 
ASUM ( b,,t,.,� • ., t:  O::inln:ich1) 
100 ..--������������������--, 
00 
exp 3 o exp 5 
JO 
;)JL_�-.....1----L-•--....L-�--.JL...----'--�--' 0 2 3 4 6 
40 
oa r l od 
F i gure -, ,,  T l rre  Ser l es  of E ff i c i ency 
Random Mechcri i em ( Con l i  ngen t L'r.::in l n:ic le )  
exp 4 
()- _ ,  · - ·  ;./.� , 
/ 
/,.. 
Q exp 6 
• '  
JJ .__ _ __._ ___ ....._ __ _.... ___ _,__ __ ......_ __ ___, CJ 3 
par l od 
6 
100 
F i i;l-Jre 21 T 1 rre  Sa r r  es cf Tota l Revenue 
ASIJM w i th  Gueue ( P r i c r i l1.1 Conln::icls) 
exp 9 o exp I 0 "' exp 1 5  
c exp0 1 7  _ . �  
.. ... ... .. .. _ .J::J., - - - - - ll.,�"(." .. , J  
... .. .. ..  / '""'Cl· - · · · - · · ·C ...._ < 
,,. ,J' ..... ..... _ / ... .. r"'\ ���<--..::·� 
2 3 
per i od 
' 
4 6 
F I gurel1.Reven.Ja fo r t�o rks t I 
ASIJM w i th  Gueue ( P r i c r i lu Conlrocle) 
exp 9 <::> exp 1 0  "' exp 1 5  
o'--��-L...���L..-��-'-���.__·��-'-��---" 
0 2 3 4 6 
per l ed 
F l gura23T l rTS  Sa r l es o f  RevEnJS t�kt 2 
ASJM w i th  Gi..Eue ( P r i c r i lu Conll"'=ICle) 
exp 9 
c exp 1 7  
<::> exp 1 0  "' exp 1 5  
o '--��-1...���.__��-'-���.__�� ........ ��--' 
0 3 6 8 
per i od 
F l gure2�T l rTS  Se r l es of To tal Reven.JS 
FISl..JM ( P r i o r i  l1.1 Ccnlroc li!1 )  
!6).--�����������������,exp 8 <::> exp 1 1  "' exp 1 4  





par l ed 
4 6 




c exp 1 6  
<::> exp 1 1  "' exp 1 4  
o L-��-1...���.L.-· ��-.__· ��-.__· ��-:-��---: 









per l ed 
F l i;l-Jre � i:.  T l rTS  Sa r l es  Rsvsrua Morks1. 2 
exp 
exp 
RSUM C P r i c r i  ty Ccnlrocle) 
8 Q exp 1 1  "' exp 1 4  
1 6  
c��� - - - -,A - - - - - .. . -.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. '""'·· 
Q .. .. .. ..  ,, .. . ..  --0- - - • " '" ""  A- - - - - - A- .... .... ·.:���§ 
I 
3 4 6 
par l ad 
F i g.ire T i me  Ser l es  Tota l Revenue 
IG ( P r i or i t� Ccn l ro::: le) 
(fi)r-�������������,,�,������-, 
exp 1 8  
c exp 2 1  
o exp 1 9  / , .,. exp �O 




a 2 ::i Ii 
per l ed 
::i 
per l ed 
F I  g..ire :l. q T I  rres Ser I es Revani..e Market 2 
IG ( Pr i o r i  tbl Conlrccla ) 
exp 1 8  
c exp 2 1  

























F l gure3oT l rre  Ser l es o f  Ta te l Rever1...S 
ASJ.l ( Con l i ngenl Canlrac le ) 





per l ed 
F ! g.m:! ) I T I  '!'13 Sa r !  E!6 R.!3Y!!!!""4...1.E! t·b�.s t 
· 
ASUM ( Con l i rr.ient Cail rccte) 
exp 3 <:> e:!Xp 5 
, .o Q· - - - - - - - - o - - ­
- - - - -o  ' ' 
--------
:'.) 




F l g..i re)2 T l rres  Ser l es  Reveni..e Morkat 2 
A� { Canl i ngsnl Conlrccle) 
ll 
:n:i�������������������--,
exp 3 o exp 5 
o L-��...L��---1-���L--��-'-��_._��� 0 :'.) Ei 
pe r i od 
F l g_J re 33 T i me  Se r l es  Rsvsrue t..\:l rks t 3 
ASU� ( Con t i  ngen l Con lra.c +_s ) 
exp 3 
-� Q //��Q ' .  o· ·· ' , , 
\ 
....... \ , 
--._' � � ' � , \ ' , , \ \ ·' ' , 
Q 
0'--��--"·���-'-·����·---��--"'���-'-·���--' a :3 




DATA FROM EXPERIMENTS 
E ' rer l lent I OUTS: sub 
l t eratne &roves 
x y bid  price 
I l l  9 100 224 
Tri.Is  = 15 
5 8 10 75 125 6 l� 
Period 1 
6 9 � l  300 4 10 
10 250 
No tri ll dah for trial  1 lone subject on porhble  l KARY.ET 2 a l l ocations: lHS: sub I y b i d  price -• t r i a l  5 t-
clod function and froze screens) . 
fin1l Al locations 101 1 5  trials  OUTS: sub I y 
b i d  price 
-t trial 10  •-
I l l  9 0 0 KARKET I a l l ocations: 
2 12 9 0 0 IHS: sub I y bi d pr! Ce 
KARKET I a l l ocations: 
3 3 6 0 0 2 12 9 230 lbb 
IMS: sub y b i d  price 
4 5 4 0 0 5 8 10 160 0 
2 10 200 
5 B 10  0 0 OUTS: sub x y b i d  price 
3 9 N 
6 9 7 0 0 1 7 7 0 lbO 
3 9 10 5 230 
-<t �1"1� 1 $  � - -• trial 3 •-
4 12 9 166 230 
6 1 2  13 0 390 
KARY.ET 2 al l ocationu 
!NS: sub x y b i d  price 
llARKET I a l l ocatlons1 
I 1 2  9 200 
!HS: sub I y bid  p r i ce KARKn 2 a l l ocationsi 
5 6 7 
2 12 9 250 m !HS: sub I y b i d  priC!  
3 3 6 5 0 l 7 7 10  0 
4 5 4 100 0 6 12 13 250 
0 
Period 2 
OUTS: sub I y bid  price  OUTS: sub I y b i d  price 
1 I I  9 0 250 2 12 9 
0 250 
5 12 10  175  250 3 9 10  
0 250 
-• trial I •- . 
6 12 13 0 255 4 12 9 0 
250 
5 8 10 0 250 
KARY.ET I a l l ocations: 
MARKET 2 al l ocations: 
!NS: sub I y bid  price 
!NS: sub x y b i d  price -t trial b t-
l 1 1  9 100 74 
b 12 13 250 100 
6 9 7 176 150 
OUTS: sub x y bid  price KARKET 1 l l l otitions: 
OUTS: sub I y b i d  price 
I I I  9 100 250 !NS: sub x y b i d  price 
2 1 2  9 250 276 2 12 9 
0 250 2 12 9 250 230 
3 1 5  1 4  100 276 
3 3 6 0 0 5 e 10 180 5 
4 12 9 m 276 
4 5 4 0 0 OUTS: sub x y b i d  pr I ct 
5 1 2  B 75 276 
s 12 10  0 250 I 7 7 0 180 3 3 6 5 180 
KARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
-• trill 4 •- 4 1 2  9 230 
250 
6 1 2  13 0 m 
IHS: sub y bi d price 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  price 
KARKET I all ot1ti ons: 
1 I I  9 0 0 
INS: sub I y bid price KARKET 2 a l l m.tions: 
2 1 2  9 0 0 
2 12 9 250 30 lNS: 
sub I y b i d  price 
3 1 5  1 4  0 0 
5 e 10 170 JO 1 7 7 25 0 
4 12 9 0 0 
OUTS: sub I y b i d  price 6 1 2  13 276 0 
5 12  e 0 0 I 7 7 0 170 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  price 
6 9 7 0 
3 3 6 5 145 
2 12 9 0 276 
4 5 4 25 165 
3 3 6 0 25 
-t tri al 2 •-
6 12 13 0 395 4 12 9 0 276 5 e 10 0 276 
KARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
KARKET 1 al locations: 
JNS: sub x y b i d  prict INS: 
sub x y b i d  price 
l 7 7 10 0 
12 9 300 201 6 12 13 250 0 
3 6 5 0 
5 4 120 70 
OUTS: sub I b i d  price 
2 12 0 250 
Period 3 
-• t r i a l  6 •--• t r : . !  1 ·-
��c..1.ET ! a ! l ou t 1 ons: 
MR!'.ET 1 a l l o'2t 1 or.s :  l�S: sub t ; d  c r i c �  INS: S!Jb y bid price 9 20 
OUTS: sub y b i d  price 11 150 lM 12 m 75 10 0 I OUTS: sub l y bid pn'e 6 12 m 7S 12 ll 0 20 I 6 7 0 0 OUTS: sub y bld  price 6 0 1 3 12  13  lOC 150 6 7 7S ISO 10 0 1 4 3 10 35 ISO 9 I I  100 250 s 5 4 0 12 1 3  100 250 -• trial 4 •- 6 12 12 ISO 9 10 145 250 
llARKET I i l locations: llARKET 2 ii l o: 1ti ons: MRKET 2 al I ocations: !HS: sub l y b i d  price INS: sub l y b i d  price INS: sub y b id  pri ce 1 12  13  2'1  1� l 6 7 2S 20 OUTS: sub l y b i d  pri ce 4 3 6 66 0 6 12  12 250 20 I 6 7 0 0 OUTS: sub l y bid price OUTS: sub l y bid price 2 9 1 1  0 0 2 9 9 0 251 2 7 I I  0 250 3 12 13 0 0 3 12 13 135 251 3 1 2  1 3  0 250 4 9 10 0 0 5 12 9 0 251 4 3 10 0 250 5 12 4 0 0 6 12  10  0 251 s 5 4 20 25 12 0 0 
"ARKET 2 al locations: -t tri 11 7 •--• trial 2 •- INS: sub ' y b i d  price 
6 12 10 201 40 llA�r.H 1 allocllions: MRKET 1 allocations: OUTS: sub l y bid price !HS: sub l y bi d pr i ce INS: sub l y b i d  price 1 12 13 0 201 2 7 1 1  1 5 0  56 1 1  1 1  500 325 2 9 9 0 201 5 12  9 170 150 OUTS: sub x y b i d  price 3 12 13 0 201 OUTS: sub x y b i d  price 1 6 10 100 m 4 3 6 0 0 I 12  10 100 264 3 7 13 250 425 5 12  9 40 201 3 1 2  9 150 170 4 3 14  135 m 4 3 6 56 150 5 12  4 75 250 -• trial 5 •- 6 12  12  0 264 6 12 175 m 
llARKET 1 illoc1tions: "AqKET 2 lllocations: "ARKET 2 al locations: INS: sub l y b i d  price !HS: sub x y b i d  price INS: sub y bid price 3 12 9 258 200 6 12  12  251 0 OUTS: sub l y bid  price 4 3 6 45 0 OUTS: sub l y bid  price l 6 10 0 0 OUTS: sub x y bi d price l 1 2  1 0  0 251 2 1 1  1 1  0 0 1 12  13  200 258 2 7 I I  0 251 3 7 13 0 0 2 I I  l 1  175 258 3 12  9 0 251 4 3 14 0 0 5 5 9 0 45 4 3 6 0 0 5 12 4 0 0 6 12  12 0 m 5 12 9 0 251 6 6 12 0 0 
MRKET 2 al locations: -t trial 8 •--• trial 3 •- IHS: sub x y b i d  price 
6 12  12 250 40 llARKET l al locations: "ARl:ET 1 al locations: OUTS: sub l y b i�  price lNS: sub y b i d  price INS: sub l y bid  price l 12  13  0 250 2 I I  150 10 3 12 13 m 325 2 l 1 1 1  0 210 5 9 160 10 OUTS: sub x y bid price 3 12  9 0 210 OUTS: sub x y bid  price I 10 150 250 4 3 0 0 l 6 7 0 150 2 7 0 0 5 5 40 m 3 12  9 10 150 6 I l l  250 4 3 6 0 150 0 250 6 12 12 0 lJO 10 175 275 
KARKET 2 d l ocitions: "ARKET 2 al ! ocatt ons: !HS: sub y b i d  price INS: sub y bid  price l 7 20 12 2 7 I 0 
12 





-f trial 9 •-
12 
y I I  
MARKET I al l ocitions: 
!HS: sub x y 
3 12  9 
5 5 9 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 6 7 
2 7 I I  
4 J 6 
6 12  12  
llAR>:ET 2 allocaUons: 
INS: sub y 
4 6 
b 12 1 2  
OUTS: sub y 
1 7 
2 I I  
3 12  9 
5 9 
-• trial  10 ·-
KARKET I all oca!lonu 
INS: sub l y 
I 12 10 
5 5 9 
OUTS: sub l y 
2 7 1 1  
l 12 ' 
4 9 10 
6 8 10 
KARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub y 
OUTS: IUb x y 
1 12 10 
2 7 1 1  
3 12  9 
4 9 10  
5 5 ' 
6 B 10 
Z51 12 





bid  price 
151 150 
270 150 
bi d price 
0 151 
150 151 
0 151  
0 421 
























-1 trial  I I 1-
lll!RKET 2 i l l oc1tioos: 
INS: sub y 
4 6 
6 12 
OUTS: sub x y 
2 I I  I I  
J 12 IJ  
-t  trill  12 ·-
llARKET 2 al l ocations: 
INS: sub y 
3 9 
6 B 
OUTS: sub l y 
2 I I  I I  
4 J 6 
-t trill 13  f-












I I  1 1  
7 9 
14 ·-
KARKET 2 al l ocations: 
INS: sub y 
J J 
6 8 
OUTS: sub y 
2 7 
4 10 
-• tri ii 15 .. 
llARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
IMS1 sub y 
l J 
6 12 
OUTSI sub x y 
2 1 1  1 1  . 4 3 6 
b i d  
5 0  
201 
b i d  
2 5  


























-• trill I t-
KARKET I l l l oc1tions: 
INS: sub l y b i d  
2 12 13 300 
OUTS: sub y bid  

































12 12 200 m 
I t  I t  10� 300 
12  9 225 300 
9 10 1 10 300 
12  4 200 3u0 
llARKEl 2 a l l oCitions: 
JHS: sub y �id price 
OUTS: sub x y bid  price 
I 12  12 0 0 
2 12 13  0 0 
J I I  I I 0 0 
4 12 9 0 0 
5 9 10  0 0 
6 12 4 0 0 
-f trill 2 f-
KARY.ET I allocations: 
INS: sub l y bid  price 
J 7 1 1  100 100 
12 4 250 m 
OOTS: sub y b i d  price 
I 8 100 100 
2 12 13  300 350 
4 12 222 250 
5 J 0 50 
KARKET 2 1 l l oc1tions: 
!HS: sub y bid price 
5 6 40 0 
OUTS: sub l y bid  price 
I 8 8 0 0 
2 12 13 0 0 
l 7 I I  0 0 
4 12 ' 0 0 
b 12 4 0 0 
-• trial 3 •-
KARY.ET I a l l ocationu 
IHS: sub x y bid  price 
4 7 ' 150 105 
6 12 ' 250 150 
OUTS: sub x y bid  price 
I B B 105 150 
2 12  13 JOO 400 
3 7 1 1  100 150 
5 15 14 0 400 
KARY.ET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y bid  price 
5 15 14 60 0 
OUTS: sub y bid  price 
I B 0 60 
12  13  0 60 OUTS: sub x bid  price 
7 1 1  0 60 I 12 12 0 405 12  13  5� 
7 9 0 60 2 12 13 m 405 7 7 '350 
12  9 0 60 3 I I  7 141 405 7 3 350 
4 7 3 BO 151 4 0 
-1 tri al 4 •-
MARKET 2 a l l ocations: -1 trul 9 •-
MRY.ET I a l l ocitions: !HS: sub x y bid  price 
!HS: sub x y bid  price  1 12  12 175 0 ftARKET l l 1 1 ocatlonu 
4 7 9 135 75 OUTS: sub x y b i d  p r i c e  INS: sub y b i d  price 
6 12  9 250 190 2 12 13 0 175 2 13 240 35 
OUTS: sub I y bid  price 3 1 1  7 0 175 4 3 170 0 l 12  10 175 250 4 7 3 0 0 6 4 165 0 
2 12  13 325 385 5 9 14  0 175 OUTS: sub I y bid  price 
3 1 1  1 1  150 250 6 5 4 0 0 1 6 8 30 240 
5 1 5  14  0 385 3 1 1  I I  200 405 
-1 tri1l 7 •- 5 9 10 0 405 
ftARr.ET 2 a l l ocation11: 
JHS: sub x y bid price KARKET I a1 1ontlons: ftARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
5 1 5  1 4  JOO 0 INS: sub I y bid  price JHS: sub y b i d  price 
OUTS: sub x y bid  price 2 12 1 3  808 200 5 10 151 0 
I 12 10 0 100 6 5 4 151 0 OUTS: sub y b i d  pnce 
2 12  1 3  0 100 OUTS: sub I y bid price I 8 0 0 
3 1 1  1 1  0 100 1 12 12  0 BOS 2 12 1 3  0 151 
7 9 0 100 3 9 9 99 808 3 1 1  I I  0 151 
12 9 0 100 4 12 13 200 808 7 3 0 0 
5 3 6 0 151 5 4 0 0 
-t trial 5 fw 
KARY.ET 2 a11ocations: -t tri1I 10 t-
KARKET I a l l ontions1 INS: sub I y bid price 
INS: sub I y bid  price I 12 12  200 0 KARY.ET 1 a l l ocations: 
2 6 7 170 165 5 3 6 100 0 INS: sub y bid  price 
6 12  9 �o 200 OUTS: sub x y bid  price 2 13 240 160 
OUTS: sub x y bid  price  2 12 1 3  0 200 4 3 170 0 
1 6 8 0 170 3 9 9 0 200 6 4 16 0 
3 1 1  1 1  200 250 4 12  1 3  0 200 OUTS: sub y bid  price 
4 7 9 165 170 6 5 4 0 100 I 10 160 240 
5 15 14 0 420 3 7 74 m 
-t triil 8 t-
MRKET 2 a l l ocations: MRKET 2 l l l ocat1ons: 
JHS: sub I y bid  price KARKET 1 all oc1tians: INS: sub y bid  price 
5 1 5  14  150 � !HS: sub I y bid  price 5 10 100 0 
OUTS: sub I y bid  price 2 12  13  m 100 OUTS: sub y bid  prier 
I 6 8 25 150 6 5 4 151 100 1 10 0 0 
2 6 7 0 125 OUTS: sub I y bid  price 2 13  0 100 
3 1 1  1 1  0 125 I 12  12  0 m 3 7 0 0 
4 7 9 0 125 3 7 7 0 151  4 3 0 0 
6 12  9 0 125 4 1 3 100 151 6 4 0 0 
5 15 6 0 325 
-• trul 6 t-
llARKET 2 a l l oc1tions: 
MP.KET I l l l ocations: JHS: sub x y bid price 
INS: sub y bid  price 5 15 6 500 150 
5 14  405 325 OUTS: sub x y bid  price  
6 4 m 80 I 12 12 150 500 
-• tn al l 1 •-
ftl<SKET 2 •llocat1ons: 
1N5: sub ) b i d  price 
1 10 15 1  90 
5 10 100 90 
0�15: sub I bid  p r i ce 3 12 13 20� 300 
90 100 4 1 1 33 100 
1 0 JOO 
5 12 13 0 300 b 
0 100 
-t tr i d  1 2  ·- KARKET 2 all oc1ti ens: 
MARKET 2 i l l m tions: !MS1 sub I y bid price 
-1 tri 11 5 •-
JNS: sub y bid p r i ce 5 1 2  13 200 0 
1 10 70 50 OUTS: sub I y bid pri ce 
KARY.ET 1 allocations: 
6 10 65 50 1 5 4 0 0 !NS: 
sub l y bid price 
OUTS: sub y bid  p r i ce 2 12 12 0 200 
3 12 13 301 300 
3 v 50 65 3 1 2  13 0 200 
6 3 6 101 bb 
4 7 1 0 0 OUTS: sub I y bid  
price 
-• tri  •I  1 3  •- 6 3 b 0 0 
1 5 4 0 101 
2 1 2  12 300 301 
MRl:ET 2 allocations: -• trhl 3 •-
4 1 7 6b 101 
5 12 13 0 301 
INS1 sub I y bid price 
I 9 10 55 45 KARKET 1 a! !oc1tions1 
5 8 10 65 SS INS: sub I y bid  price K
ARY.ET 2 all ocations: 
OUTS: sub I y bid  price  3 1 2  13 
301 300 !NS: sub I y 
bid price 
3 1 1  1 1  0 1 10 6 3 6 101 44 
I 5 4 100 0 
OOTS: sub I y bid  price 
5 12 13 sooo 0 
I s 4 0 101 OUTS: sub I y 
bid  price 
Period S 2 12 12 300 301 
2 12 12 0 5000 
7 1 44 101 3 12 13 
0 5000 
1 2  1 3  0 301 4 7 7 
0 100 
3 b 0 100 
-• tri •l 1 •- KARKET 2 allocations: !MS: 1ub y bid  price 
KARKET 1 a!locations: 1 5 4 100 0 
!MS: sub I y bid price 5 12 13 5000 0 
1 5 4 100 0 OUTS1 sub I y bid  price 
3 1 2  13 300 300 2 12 12 0 5000 
OUTS: sub I y bid  price 3 12 13 0 sooo 
2 1 2  12 300 JOO 4 7 7 0 100 
4 v 1 1  1 1 1  300 6 3 6 0 100 
5 1 2  1 3  0 300 
6 9 b 0 289 -• trial 4 •-
MARKET 2 a ! l ocatlonl: KARKET I a!locatlonu 
INS! sub I y bid  price !NS: sub I y bid price 
5 12 13 50 � 3 12 13 301 300 
OUTS: sub I y bid  price 6 3 6 !O! b6 
I s ' 0 0 OUTS: sub I y Ud price 
2 1 2  12 0 50 I 5 4 0 101 
3 1 2  1 3  0 50 2 12 12 300 301 
4 9 1 1  0 2S 4 7 7 b6 101 
6 9 b 25 50 s 12 13 0 301 
-• tru! 2 •- KARKET 2 allocations: 
INS: sub I y bid price 
MARKET 1 a!locations: I 5 ' 100 0 
INS: sub I y bid  price 5 12 13 5000 0 
2 12 12 300 200 OOTS: sub I y bid price 
6 3 b 100 75 2 12 12 0 5000 
OUTS: sub x bid pr lee 3 12 13 0 5000 
I 75 100 
:xperi nnt 2 10  
lter ati ve Srovu OUTS: sub I y 
I 1 2  13  
Per iod l 2 1 5  6 
' a lO 
6 I I  I I  
·t trill I t· 
llARKET 2 d loc1tion11 
�ARKET I i l l ocations: INS: sub y 
IHS: sub x y bid  prier ' 10  
2 1 5  6 lOO 10 OUTS: sub l y 
3 5 4 9 1  10  I 1 2  13  
OUTS: sub I y bid  price 2 15 6 
l 4 3 10  9 1  l 5 ' 
4 B 10 0 90 5 9 10 
5 1 2  ll 0 100 6 I I  1 1  
6 9 9 0 90 
-t triil 4 •-
HARKE! 2 i l l OCitions: 
INS: sub l y iid  price HARKE! I al l ocati ORll 
5 1 2  13  200 3 1  INS: sub l y 
OUTS: sub l y bid price 2 1 5  6 
I 4 3 0 0 3 5 ' 
2 15 6 0 200 OUTS: lllb l y 
3 5 ' 0 0 I 1 2  9 
4 9 10  0 169 4 8 lO 
6 9 9 3 1  200 5 9 7 
6 I I  9 
·t trial 2 •-
MRKET 2 11l oc1tionu 
llARKET I ii I ocat ions: INS: sub l y 
!HS: sub y bid  price 4 8 10 
l 4 93 0 6 I I  9 
5 12 13  200 150 OUTS: sub l y 
OUTS: sub l y bid  prier I 12 9 
I 1 2  13  0 200 2 1 5  6 
2 1 5  6 llO 200 l 5 4 
4 12 1 2  150 200 5 9 1 
6 1 1 0 93 
-• trhl 5 •-
llARKET 2 allocations: 
INS: sub x y bid  price MRKET I i l l  0Cition11 
I 1 2  13  20  0 INS: sub I y 
6 1 1 31  0 3 5 4 
OUTS: sub I y bid price 5 12 13  
2 15 6 0 5 1  OUTS: sub l y 
3 ' 4 0 20 I 1 2  9 
4 1 2  1 2  0 20 2 15 14  
5 1 2  1 3  0 20 4 8 10 
6 I I  9 
-• trul 3 t· 
HARKE! 2 d l oc1tion11 
HARKE! l a l locations: INS: sub I y 
INS: sub x y bid price I 12 9 

























41  1 5  
b i d  price 
15 4 1  
0 1 17 
0 41  
0 41 








bid  price 
42 26 
76 0 
OUTS: sub l y 
2 15 14  
l 5 4 
5 1 2  1 3  
6 l l  9 
-1 trhl 6 •-
HARKE! I alloution11 
!HSI IUb l y 
2 15 14  
l 5 ' 
OUTS1 sub I y 
I 12 9 
' 8 lO 
5 9 10  
6 l l  
HARKE! 2 il l oc1tions1 
INS: sub I 
I 12 
' 8 













l l  
HARKE! I 1 l l ocation11 
INS: sub l y 
3 5 I 
5 9 lO 
IXJTS1 sub I y 
I 1 2  9 
2 9 lO 
4 8 10 
6 I I  9 
HARKE! 2 1 1 l ocation11 
INS1 sub I y 
2 9 10 
6 I I  9 
OUTS: sub I y 
I 12 9 
l ' 4 
4 8 10 
5 9 10 
-t trill 8 •-
llARKET l • l l ocations: 









































1 l  I l l  105 price OUTS: sub I y bid price 1 18 I 7 9 0 1 1 1  42 2 9 lO 0 I l l  1 1 9  3 5 I 100 l l l  1 2  ' a 10  105 l l l  
HARKE! 2 illocatlons: 
IHS: sub y bid p r 1 ' 1  
l 9 30 0 prier 2 lO :?00 •) 1500 OUTS: sub y bij  price  0 3 4 0 30 prier 4 10 0 30 2100 5 10  0 30 700 l l  9 0 30 2 1 00  
2100 -• trul 9 •-
HARKE! l illocmons: prier INS: sub y bid price 0 3 ' lbO 106 0 5 10  3500 106 price OUTS1 sub I y bid  price 1 1 8  l 7 9 0 !10 12 2 9 lO 0 160 12  4 8 10  0 160 1 18 6 1 l  9 106 lliO 
�ARKET 2 allocations: 
!HS: sub y bid pricr 
2 10  100 20 price 4 10 53 :o 0 OUTS1 sub I y bid  pnct 0 I 1 9 20 53 price 3 5 ' 0 53 2500 5 9 10  0 53 100 6 I I  9 0 53 100 
100 ·t trial 10  •-
llARKET I d l otitions: price !NS: sub I y bid prict 76 l 4 3 50 0 76 3 5 4 180 81 price 5 9 10 9m I l l  224 OUTS: sub x y bid price 100 2 15 6 160 10019 100 4 a lO 0 230 100 6 l l  9 Ill 230 
MRKET 2 alloc1tions1 
IHS1 sub ' bid priee 
4 10 ll 0 price !lUTS1 sub I bid price 105 
-t trul I •-
4 J 0 
-t trul b •-
1 5  6 53 "ARKET I a l l ocations: MRKET 2 a l l ocations:  
5 4 0 !NS: sub x y b i d  price !MS: sub x y b i d  p r i c e  �ARKET 1 ' 1 l ocations1 
9 10  0 5 12 1 2  1000 100 I 1 1  1 1  50 0 INS: sub y bi d  p r i ce 
I I  9 0 6 6 7 121  0 4 5 9 10  0 
5 1 2  999• ISO 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  price OUTS: sub x y bi d price OUTS: sub x y bi d  p r i c e  
-• tri  11 11 ·- l I I  1 1  0 1000 1 2  9 0 50 I I I  1 1  0 9099 
2 12  1 3  200 1000 15 6 0 so 2 12 9 m 9999 
MRKET 2 . t l ocations: 3 9 10  93  1000 1 2  1 2  0 60 3 9 10 101 9999 
:NS: sub y b i d  price 4 5 9 JO 1000 6 7 0 10  4 9 0 9849 
2 10 100 0 
6 12 10 9999 
10 76 0 �ARKET 2 al l ocations: -• tri d 4 •-
OUTS: sub y b i d  price INS: sub x y b i d  price llARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
6 1 1  46 l70  I 1 1  1 1  50 0 llARKET 1 a l l ocations: INS: sub y b i d  price 
OUTS: sub ' y b i d  price INS: sub x y b i d  price I 1 1  I I  300 50 
-• trial  1 2  ·- 2 1 2  13  0 50 3 ' 9  10 m• 3000 4 5 9 1 0  0 
l 9 10  0 50 6 7 61 0 OUTS: sub x y b i d  price 
�ARKET 2 a l l ontions: 4 5 9 0 0 OUTS: sub y bid  price  2 12 9 0 JOO 
INS: sub x y l i d  price 5 12  1 2  0 50 I I I  I I  0 9999 
3 9 10 0 300 
6 I I 1 1  300 196 6 7 0 0 2 12  9 0 9999 5 8 1 2  0 310 
OUTS: sub y b i d  p r i ce 4 5 9 0 61 6 12 1 0  50  300 
2 10 120 224 -• trial 2 1- 5 12 12 JOOO 9999 
4 10 76 180 
-• tr i al 7 1-
MRKET I d l ocations: MRKET 2 a l l oc1tion!I 
-• trial 13  ·- !NS: sub y b i d  price INS: sub x y bid  price �ARKET 1 a l l ocatlcns: 3 10 500 500 2 12  9 300 so !NS: sub x y b i d  prict 
MRY.ET l a l l ocations: 7 121 0 4 5 9 10 
1 2  9 200 1 2 1  
!NS: sub y b i d  p r i c e  OUTS: sub x y b i d  price OUTS: sub y b i d  price 8 
8 99'19 0 
2 10 280 46 I 1 1  1 1  0 500 I I I  I I  50 300 OUTS: sub x y b i d  �n ee 
4 8 5 1 0 12  9 500 500 J 9 10 0 JOO I 1 1  1 1  0 200 
OUTS: sub y b i d  price s 9 0 121  12  12  310 
9 6 85 :oo 
6 I I  46 280 12 1 2  400 500 6 7 10  5 9 0 200 12 121  zoo 
-t trial  1 4  ·- !IARKET 2 a l l ocationu -• t r i al 5 •-INS: sub x y b i d  price MARKET 2 l l l mt l ons: 
MAPKET 2 al l ocations: I I I  I I 50 0 MRKET I i l l oc1tions:  INS:  sub x y b i d  pnct 
INS: sub x y b i d  price  4 5 9 20 0 INS: sub y b i d  price 
I I I  I I  250 0 
4 9 10 76 0 OUTS: sub x y b i d  price l 10 100 51  4 5 9 1 0 0 
6 1 1  9 46 0 2 1 2  9 0 50 5 8 im 51 
OUTS1 !Ub x y l i d  Pritt  
OUTS: sub x y ) i d  price  3 9 10  0 so OUTSI sub x y bid  price  
2 12  9 0 250 
2 15  14  2 1 22 5 12  12  0 70 I I I  I I  0 100 3 9 6 0 10 6 7 0 20 2 12  9 0 100 5 e 8 0 10 
-• trial  15  ·- 4 5 9 0 100 
6 12  7 0 250 
-· trill l ·- 7 5 1  100 -• trial  B •-
�ARKET 2 d l ocations: 
!NS: sub y b i d  p r ! C I  MARKET I l l l ocations1 MRKET 2 a l l ocations: 
z 10 500 4 1  !NS: sub x y b i d  price INS: sub x y bid  price  
�ARKET 1 a l l oc1tions: 
4 10 76 I I  5 12  12  1500 550 2 12 9 150 so 
!NS: sub x y b i d  p r : c e  
OUTS: sub I b i d  price  6 6 7 7 1  0 4 5 9 10 0 
2 1 2  9 3t)0 0 
6 I I  4 1  76 OUTS: sub x y bid  price OUTS: sub x y b i d  pnct 
5 8 ! �  9999 0 
I 1 1  1 1  0 1�00 I 1 1  1 1  50 150 OUIS1 sub x y bi d  pr: ct 
2 1 2  9 �50 1500 l 9 10 0 150 1 1 1  1 1  0 !Om 
Period 2 J 1 5  6 100 !S71 5 a 0 10 
1 6 0 JOO 
4 5 l 0 1021 6 7 10 4 0 JOO 
12 10 0 300 
�ARY.ET 2 a l l ocations: 
-• trial l l  •- -• tri d 4 •-
INS: sub x y b i d  price "ARKET 2 a l l ocat1ons: MRKET 2 d l ocations: �ARKET I a l l ocations: 
I l l  1 1 250 51 !HS: sub x y bid price !HS: sub x y bid  price !HS: sub y b i d  price J 9 6 20 10 1 1 1  l l  450 7 l  1 12  13  )00 0 J 12  9 190 l·lO 
OUTS: sub x y bid  price 4 5 9 13 0 OUTS: sub x y bid  price 6 9 1'll 100 2 1 2  9 0 260 OUTS: sub x y bid  price 2 1 1  l l  0 600 OUIS1 sub x y bid  price 4 5 9 10 20 3 15 14 50 463 3 12  13 0 600 l 12 13 0 376 5 8 10 0 209 9 10 71 450 4 9 10 0 600 2 7 l l  100 101 6 1 2  1 0  6 1  260 5 5 ' 0 0 4 J 6 0 96 -• trial 12  ·- 6 12  10 0 600 5 5 4 5 101 
-• trial 9 •-
"ARKET 2 all out ions: -• trial 2 •- "A�KET 2 alloc•tion11 
�ARKET I d l acations: INS: sub x y b i d  price INS: sub x y bid  price  lHS1 sub x y b i d  prict I 1 1  1 1  450 76 KARKET I ll locations: I 12 13 600 0 
2 12  9 ;oo 1 4 1  3 9 6 40 12  IHS: sub x y b i d  price 4 3 6 15 0 
5 8 9 9999 0 OUTS: sub x y b i d  price 3 12 ' 9 290 245 OUTS: sub x y b i d  price OUTS: sub x y b i d  price 4 5 9 12  40  4 3 6 JO 0 7 1 1  0 600 
1 1 1  l l  0 500 6 9 10 76 450 5 5 4 5 0 12  9 0 bOO 
3 9 6 0 500 OUTS: sub x y b i d  price 5 4 0 15 
5 9 0 500 -• trial 13 ·- 1 1 2  I J  0 m 6 0 600 
12  7 HI 500 2 1 1  l l  250 295 
MRKET 2 d l ocationu 6 12  10  191 ZBO -• trial 5 •-
"ARKET 2 a l l ocations: INS: sub x y bid price 
!HS: sub x y b i d  price I I I  1 1  450 66 KARKET 2 a l l ocations: KARXET I al l ocations: 
I I I  1 1  250 1 2  3 9 6 55 25 INS: sub x y bid price INS: sub x y b i d  price ' 5 9 20 I2 OUTS1 sub x y bid  price I 1 2  13  600 0 2 7 1 1  1 1 5  7l  
OUTS: sub x y b i d  price ' 5 9 25 55 OUTSI sub x y b i d  price 3 12  9 cSO 7 1  
2 12  9 0 250 9 10 66 450 2 l l  I I  0 600 OUTS! sub x y b i d  price 3 9 1 2  20 3 12  9 0 600 l 12  ll  0 390 
5 8 0 20 -• trial 14 •- 4 3 6 0 0 4 3 0 1 10 
6 12  0 250 5 5 4 0 0 5 5 5 l 1 5  MRKET 2 a l l ocations: 6 12  10  0 600 6 ; 71 1 15 
-• trul 10 ·- IHS: sub x y bid  price 
I 1 1  1 1  m 66 -• trid J •- �ARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
KARKET I a l locations: 3 9 6 57 1a !HS: sub x y b i d  price 
IHS: sub x y b i d  price OUTS1 sub y b i d  price llARKET l al locations: I 12  IJ 600 0 
2 1 2  9 500 I l l  4 2 10 �7 !HS: sub x y bid price 4 J 6 15 0 5 B 8 9999 100 6 10 66 425 3 12  9 280 5 OUTS: sub x y b i d  p r i ce 
OUTS: sub x b i d  price 6 6 8 SB 0 2 7 l l  0 600 
I 7 100 m OOTS: sub x y b i d  price l 12  9 0 600 
1 9 110 m Period 3 I 12  13 0 369 5 5 4 0 15 
4 3 5 180 2 7 1 1  0 88 6 8 0 600 
b 1 2  171 500 4 3 6 0 88 
-• trial  I •- 5 12  9 5 250 -• trld 6 •-
llARKET 2 alloc1t1ons1 
INS: sub y b i d  price KARKET I a l lat1tlonsi KARKET 2 al l ocations: �ARKET 1 al l oc1tions1 
OUTS: sub ' y b i d  p r i u  !HS: sub x y b i d  price INS: sub x y b i d  price lHS1 sub y b i d  price 
I 7 7 0 0 5 5 4 5 0 2 7 1 1  600 600 l 12 9 290 125 
12  0 0 6 12  10  191  150 4 J 6 20 0 5 4 l50 115 
9 0 OUTS: sub x y b i d  price OUTS1 sub x y bid price OU!91 tub ' y b i d  price l Q I 12  IJ  0 191 I 1 2  ll  >OO 600 I 12  1l 0 280 8 0 2 H 1 1  100 191 J 12  9 0 20 2 7 l l  125 150 
12 0 3 12  l l  150 191 5 1 2  1 0 11) 4 1 6 0 0 
4 9 10 23 191  6 9 0 20 9 71 150 
-t tri•I  9 t· 
"ARKET 2 a l l ocat1on5: MARKET I al l ocations: 
MRKET 2 a l l ocations: MARKET 2 •l locat1 ons: 
!NS: sub ' y b i d  pr i ce !HS: sub y b i d  prict INS:
 sub y b i d  price iHS:  sub y b id  price 
12 13 600 0 l 12 7 600 275 
2 1 1  120 1 16 I 1 2  1 2  &00 0 
3 6 1 0  ? 7 1 1  !BO 121 
OUTS: sub I y b i d  pric• 0UTS: sub l y bid  pr i ce  
ceTS: sub x y b i d  p r i c e  OUTS: sub x y b i d  price 
J 1 2  9 1 1 5  120 12 1 3  0 600 
2 7 1 1  0 600 3 1 2  9 m ;oo 
4 9 10 20 120 J l l  l l  0 &00 
3 1 2  9 0 600 4 J 6 0 m 
6 1 2  12 1 1 6  120 4 7 9 0 oOO 
5 5 4 0 10 5 5 4 5 180 
5 10 0 ;oo 
6 B 8 0 bOO 6 8 8 1 2 1  180 
-t t r i al ll ·- 6 0 0 
-• trill 7 •- "ARKET 2 a l l  ocatianu 
"ARKET 2 d l oc•tions: -• trill 2 •-
INS: sub y bid  price !HS: sub y b i d  price 
MARKET l d l oc•tions: 4 6 1 0  0 
2 1 1  m m MRKET l il l ocations: 
!HS: sub x y b i d  pr ier OOTS: sub x y b i d  prict 6 
B I I  0 !HS: sub y b i d  pr i ce  
2 7 1 1  180 m l 1 2  7 0 0 
OUTS: sub · x y bid  price 2 10 200 m 
l 1 2  9 m 21)0 2 7 l l  0 0 J 1 2  
9 125 150 6 4 I ll  JO  
OUTS: sub x y b i d  prtc• J 1 2  9 0 0 4 9 
10 40 150 OUTS: sub x y b i d  pr i ce 
l 12 1 3  0 m 5 5 4 0 0 
l 1 2  1 2  0 200 
J 6 0 180 6 8 8 0 0 
-• triil 14 ·- J 7 l l  175 200 
4 1 2  ll 120 200 
1 2  4 200 2 1 5  
B B 125 180 -• t r i al 10 ·-
MRKET 2 a l l ocations: 5 9 10 1 0  m 
!HS: sub x y bid  prict 
MARKET 2 a l l ocations: "ARKET l a l l ocations: 
J 1 2  9 160 150 ,ARKET 2 al l out1ons: 
!HS: sub y bid  price  !HS: sub I y bid  price 6 
8 3 1  25 !HS: sub I y bid  pri ce 
l 12 1 3  &00 0 l 1 2  7 400 280 
OOTS: sub y b t d  prict l 1 2  1 2  600 0 
4 J 6 10 Q 5 5 4 9999 125 
2 1 1  150 160 OUTS: sub y b i d  oric• 
OUTS: sub y bid price OUTS: sub y bid  prict 
4 6 25 3 1  2 1 0  0 600 
l l 0 600 2 1 1  170 400 
l 1 1  0 ;oo 
12 9 0 100 J 1 2  9 280 400 
-• trial 1 5  ·- 12 ll  0 bOO 
10 0 ;oo 
12 4 0 600 4 1 5  1 4  0 400 
8 B 0 600 6 8 8 125 400 
�ARKET 2 a l locations: 4 0 0 
lNS1 sub x y bid  pr i c e  
- t  t r i al 8 •- HARKE! 2 al locations: 
J 1 2  9 1 10 33 -t trial J 1-
!HS: sub x y bid  prict 6 B 13 0 
MARKET I al  l ocations: 4 1 5  1 4  1 0  0 
OUTS: tub y b i d  prier �ARKET l a l l oc•tions: 
!HS: sub I y b i d irict DUIS: sub x y b i d  pric• 
2 1 1  0 1 10 IMS: sub I y b i d  pr ict 
2 7 l l  150 0 l 1 2  7 0 10 
4 10 ll 1 1 0  I 12 1 2  oOO 200 
5 1 2  9 400 200 2 9 1 1  0 IO 
6 5 4 m 0 
DUTS: sub x y b t d  prier 3 1 2  9 0 1 0  
OOTS: sub x y b t d  pr iet  
I 12 1 3  0 550 5 5 4 0 0 
Pmod 4 2 9 10 
�1}0 600 
3 1 2  3 200 400 B 8 0 IO 
l 9 9 100 m 
4 7 9 JQO m 
4 J 6 0 150 
12 12 0 550 -• trhl 1 1  t- -• tri al l •-
s 9 IO  j 533 
MRKET 2 all ocations: HARKE! 2 a l l ocationu 
�ARKET l a l l outions: MARKET 2 a l l oc•tionu 
iNS: sub x y bi d p r i ce INS: sub x y b i d  price INS: sub y 
b i d  pnct INS: sub y bid pric• 
I l? 1 3  600 100 3 1 2  9 !CB IOI 
5 10 200 100 OUTS: sub x y b i d  pnce 
4 J 6 1 0  0 OUTS: sub x y bid  pr1c1 6 4 
rn 45 I 1 2  1 2  0 0 
OUTS: sub I y btd  pri c• 2 9 I I  100 !OB OUTS1 sub y 
bid  �ria 2 9 10 0 0 
7 1 1  0 600 4 1 5  1 4  1 0  109 
l l Z  1 2  0 zoo J 9 9 Q 0 
1 2  J 0 600 1 2  12 IO I  !OB 
2 1 2  1 3  100 zoo 4 7 9 0 0 
12 9 0 600 
J I I  I l  10 100 5 JO  0 0 
1 2  1 2  100 600 -• tri al 1 2  ·-
7 4� 133 6 4 0 
-+ trul 4 •-
MARKET I a l l oc•tions: MRl(ET 2 a l l oc•tions: 
!HS: sub f bid price IHS1 sub y bid pric1 
KARKET 2 illotitlons1 
3 9 9m 600 4 9 l 0 KARKET I a l l oc•tionu IHS: sub x y bid  pric• 
4 rn m OUTS: sub x y bid pnc• IMS: sub y �id  pri ce 1 12 1 2  oOO 149 
OUTS: sub x y bid  pr i ce I 12 1 2  0 l 
3 9 9999 1000 6 5 4 2 1  0 
I 12  12 600 9999 2 12 1 3  0 l 
6 4 166 1 OUTS: sub y bid  price 
12 13  500 9999 3 9 9 0 0 
OUTS: sub x y btd  pric• 3 9 50 501 
7 9 m m 5 9 1 0  0 0 
1 12 12 1000 9999 4 9 120 571 
10 l 1 3 3  6 5 4 0 0 
2 12 l l  1000 9999 
4 12 ll  0 9999 -• tri il ll •-
MARKET 2 a l l oc•tions: -• triil 7 •- 5 9 1 0  l 166 
INS: sub y bid  pri ce 
"ARKET 2 a l l ontions: 
OUTS: sub x y btd  price "ARKET 1 alloc1.tionu 
KARkET 2 1 l l oc1.tions: JHS1 sub x y b i d  pr in 
1 12 12 0 0 ISS: sub x y bid irict !HS: sub x y bid  price 1 12 12 600 m 
2 12 1 3  0 0 I 1 2  1 2  1500 200 
4 1 2  l l  1 0 6 5 4 66 45 
3 9 9 0 0 6 5 4 m 0 
OUTS: sllb x y b i d  prin OUTS: sub y bid  prtc1 
4 7 9 0 . 0 OUTS: sub x y bid  price 1 12 12 0 I 3 9 150 555 
5 9 10 0 0 2 12 ll 200 1500 2 12 ll 0 4 3 45 66 
6 5 4 0 0 l 9 9 100 1500 
l 7 9 0 
4 7 9 0 1500 5 9 1 0  0 
-• trial 5 t- 5 9 10 1 1500 6 5 4 0 
Period 5 
MARKET 1 a l l ocations: "ARKET 2 allDCit i DRSI -• trhl 10 ... 
IHS: sub x y bid  price  IHS1 sub y bid pri c1 
-• triil 1 •-
12 ll  l?<lO 600 4 9 l 0 
MARKET 1 ill oc1tions: 
s 4 rn 0 OUTS: sub x y bid  pr ic1 INS: sub x y b i d  prict MRKET l 1 l loc1tions: 
OUTS: sub y bid  pr!C!  l I2  1 2  0 1 
2 12 ll  800 JOO IHS1 sub x y b i d  prict 
l 1 0  oOO 1000 2 12 1 3  0 1 5 l 6 1000 166 
I 3 2 1 0 
3 1 1  98 MOO 3 9 9 0 0 
OUTS:  sub x y b i d  prlC! 3 1 2  10 250 100 
4 9 0 5ll 5 9 lO 0 0 
1 12 1 2  300 800 6 3 6 IVI 49 
5 1 0  1 533 6 5 4 0 0 
3 7 9 1 2 5  m OUTS: sub x y bid  prict 
4 7 3 75 m 2 1 2  1 2  100 250 
MRKET 2 al locations: -• trial 8 •- 6 5 4 166 675 
4 9 90 250 
INS: sub  y Rid price 
5 7 50 102 
4 9 l 0 "ARKET 1 all  ocatl ons: 
�ARKET 2 1 l loc1tions: 
OUTS: sub x y bid pr ice INS1 sub x y bid  pric1 !HS: sub x y bi d prict MRKET 2 a l l oc•tlons: 
1 8 1 0  0 0 1 12 12 !300 1000 
OUTS; sub x y b i d  pr:c• !HS: sub y b i d  price 
2 12 ll  0 1 5 3 6 9999 166 
I I2  1 2  0 0 OUTS: sub x y b i d  pric! 
l 9 1 1  0 0 OUTS: sub x y bid prict 
2 12 13  0 0 1 3 2 0 0 
5 9 1 0  0 0 2 12 1 3  1000 1300 
3 1 9 0 2 12 1 2  0 0 
5 4 0 0 3 7 9 120 1 134 
4 7 3 0 l 12 1 0  0 0 
4 7 9 0 1 1 34 5 3 0 4 9 9 0 1) 
-• tri al 6 •- 6 5 4 166 1 180 
6 5 1) 5 7 9 0 0 
6 l 6 0 0 
�ARKET l a l l ocat1onu HARKE! 2 11l oc1tion1: -• tri ll 11 •-
INS: sub x y bid price INS: sub y bid pric1 
·• trhl 2 •-
1 12 12 1005 200 4 9 1 0 
�ARKET 2 a l l ocitlons: 
b 5 4 m 0 !JUTS: sub ' y bid prict INS: sub x y btd  price MRKET 1 •I locations: 
OUTS! sub ' y bid  pric• l 12 12 0 1 1 1 2  12 600 120 !HS: sub y bid  prict 
2 12  13  200 1005 2 1 2  13  0 1 
6 5 4 bb 1) I 2 1 0 
l 9 9 19 I005 3 7 9 0 0 
OUTS: sub x y bid  1r: c1 2 12 200 150 
4 7 9 •) 1005 5 3 6 0 0 
3 1 9 50 600 6 78 l9 
1 10 1005 6 5 0 0 4 1 2  13  120 600 
!lUTS: sub x y b i d  prict 
3 12 lO 150 200 
-• trial 9 •· -• trial  12 ·- 1 40 79 
0 129 
�ARKET Z a l l oc.tions: 
INS: sub x y b i d  
OUTS: sub x y bid  
l 2 0 
S lZ 
3 IZ lO 0 
4 7 7 0 
s 7 9. 0 
0 
-• trial 3 •-
•ARKET l a l l ocations: 
IHS: sub ' y b i d  
2 9 12 250 
3 1 2  7 21)0 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  
l J 2 I 
4 7 7 40 
MRKET 2 a l l oc.tions: 
INS: sub I y 
OUTS: sub x y 
1 J 2 
8 12  
1 2  7 
4 7 7 
5 
b 
-• trial 4 •-
MPRKET I a l l ocations: 





l l  l l  
7 9 
"ARKET l al l ocations: 
!NS: 5'Jb x y 
4 l ! l l  
OUTS: sub 
l 
2 a 12  
J 
1 
8 1  
b i d  
b i d  
0 
0 









































-• trial S •-
MPKET I allot•tions: 
INS: sub x y bid  pric• 




OUTS: sub x y bid pric• 
2 8 1 2  250 471 
3 12 7 130 351 
4 1 1  I I  0 500 
12 13 500 
MRKET 2 al l ocations: 
INS: sub x y bid price 
4 11 I I  I 0 
OUTS: sub x y bid  price 
I 12 9 0 I 
2 8 12 
3 1 2  7 
s 12 lJ 
b 3 b 
-• trial b •-




INS: sub x y b i d  
s 12 ll 500 
b IOI 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  
l 12 9 250 
2 8 12 JOO 
3 b lO ISO 
4 I I I I  
llARKET 2 a l l ocati ons: 
IMS: su� x y b i d  
4 I I  I I  1 
OUTS: sub x y bid 
1 l2 9 0 
2 8 12 
3 b lO 
5 12 ll  0 
b l b 0 
-· trial 7 ·-
HARrET l .t l ocotions: 
INS: .ub x y b i d  
2 8 12 500 
b 3 b IOI  
OUTS: su b  x y bid 
I 5 9 0 
12 10  250 
4 1 1  l l  0 

























"ARKET 2 al l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
I 5 9 
II l l  
OUTS: sub x y 
2 8 12  
3 12 lO 
s 12 13 
b l 
-t trhl B 1-
MARKET I a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
3 12 7 
s 4 
b 3 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 5 9 
2 B l2 
4 II l l  
"ARKET 2 a l l ocotion.: 
INS: sub x y 
I 5 ! 
4 I I  1 1  
OUTS: sub x y 




-• trial 9 •-
"ARKET l • I I ocotions: 
IMS: sub x y 





4 II l l  
5 12 13 
�APYET 2 •l l ocotions: 
I�S: sub x y 
l 5 9 
I I  1 1  
OUTS: sub x y 






















b i d  
300 






b i d  
2 0  



































-• triill IO •-
�ARKET I all ocations: 
INS: sub x y bid 
2 B 1 2  500 
J 12  7 205 
OUTS: sub x y bid  
I S 2 20 
4 7 7 50 
s 12 l l  299 
3 b IOI 
MARKET 2 a l locations: 
INS: sub x y bid 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  
I 5 2 0 
2 B 12  
l 1 2  7 
4 7 7 
12 1 l  
b 
-• trial II 1-
MARKET 2 • 1 1 ocations: 
INS: sub x y bid 
4 9 9 BO 
b 41 
OUTS: sub x y bid  
I S ! 20 
5 12 Il bO 
-• triill 12 •-
"ARKET 2 al l ocotion<: 
INS: sub x y bid  
1 3 2 1 
IS l4  B l  
OUTS: sub  x y b i d  
4 9 ! 80 
12 Il 80 
-• trid ll •-
MARKET 2 all ocations: 
INS: sub x y b 1 d 
4 9 ! Bl 
b 1 1 0  ! l  
OUTS: scb ' y \ 1 d  
I J 2 �O 
5 12 Il 90 
-• t r :  11  14 •-








































12 l l  
b 9 10  
-t trid lS •-
MARKET 2 a l l otation51 
INS: sub x y 
S l2 IJ 
b l ! 
OUTS: sub I y 





b i d  











pri c o  
9 l  










-t triil I t-
nARKET I allocations: 
INS: sub x y 
I 7 9 
3 12 9 
OOTSI sub x y 
2 9 6 
4 12 1 2  
5 12 1 3  
6 9 9 
llARKET 2 allocations: 
INS: sub x y 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 7 9 
2 9 6 
3 1 2  9 
4 12 12 
5 12 13 
6 9 9 
-t trhl 2 t-
ftARKET I alloCitions: 
INS: sub x y 
I 7 9 
3 12 9 
OUTS: sub x y 
2 9 10 
4 12 12 
5 12 10 
6 9 9 
llARKET 2 al locations: 
INS: sub x y 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 7 9 
2 9 10 
3 12 9 
4 12 12 


































































-t tri al 3 t-
llARKET I al l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
I 7 9 
3 1 2  9 
OUTS: sub x y 
2 9 10 
4 8 12 
5 12 1 3  
6 1 1  1 1  
ftARKET 2 allocations: 
1115: sub x y 
2 9 10  
OUTS: sub x y 
I 7 9 
3 12 9 
4 8 1 2  
5 12 1 3  
6 II 1 1  
- t  trial 4 1-
"ARKET I a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
4 8 12 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 7 9 
2 3 10  
3 12 9 
5 9 10 
6 I I  I I  
ftARKET 2 allocations: 
INS: sub x y 
5 9 10 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 7 9 
2 3 10 
3 12 9 
4 8 12 
6 1 1  1 1  
-t tri al 5 t-
�ARKET I al l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
1 7 9 
3 12 4 
OUTS: sub x y 
2 3 6 
4 12 12  
5 12 7 









b i d  
15:1 






b i d  
400 






b i d  
90 





















































ftARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y bid 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  
I 7 9 0 
2 3 6 0 
3 1 2  4 0 
4 12 12 0 
5 12 7 0 
6 11 1 1  0 
-• tri al 6 1-
ftARKET I allotitions: 
INS: sub x y bid 
3 5 4 250 
5 12  7 280 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  
I 7 9 150 
2 9 10 160 
4 12 12 0 
6 7 9 100 
llARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y bid 
4 12 12 75 
OUTS: sub x y bid 
I 7 9 0 
2 9 10 0 
3 5 4 0 
5 1 2  7 
7 9 0 
-t triil 7 1-
ftARKET I a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y bid 
2 J 6 100 
3 5 4 300 
5 1 2  7 260 
OUTS: sub x y bid 
I 7 9 200 
4 12 12 0 
6 I I  1 1  
ftARKET 2 a l l oCitions: 
INS: sub x y b i d  
4 12 12 BO 
!HITS: sub x y bid 
I 7 9 0 
2 3 6 0 
3 5 4 0 
s 1'2 7 0 







































-t tri al 8 1-
ftARKET I allocations: 
INS: sub x y 
I 1 'l.. 9 
2 3 6 
3 s 4 
OUTS: sub x y 
4 12 1 2  
5 1 2  7 
6 I I  1 1  
llARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 1 1.. 9 
2 3 6 
3 5 • 
4 12 1 2  
5 1 2  7 
6 I I  1 1  
-t trial 9 t-
"ARKET I a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
1 7 9 
5 12 7 
OUTS: sub x y 
2 9 10 
3 5 4 
4 12 12 
6 I I  I I  
ftARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
2 9 10 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 7 9 
3 5 4 
4 12 12 
5 12 7 
6 1 1  1 1  
-t trial 1 0  t-
MRKET l a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
I I '}... 9 
2 3 
5 
OUTS: sub x y 
4 1 2  1 2  
! �  





b i d  
89 
260 
1 0  
bid 







































































"ARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
4 12 12 
OOTSz sub x y 
I 7 9 
2 3 6 
3 5 4 
5 1 2  7 
6 I I  1 1  
- t  tri al 1 1 t-
llARKET 2 allocations: 
INS: sub x y 
4 12 1 2  
7 7 
OUTS: sub x y 
5 9 10 
-t trial 12 t-
MRKET 2 al I ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
5 9 10  
6 7 7 
OUTS: sub x 
4 12 1 2  
-t tri al 13 t-
llARKET 2 al l oc at i ons: 
INS: sub x y 
5 9 10 
6 I I  9 
OUTS: sub x y 
4 12 12 
- t  trial 1 4  t-
PIARKET 2 al l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
4 B 12 
OUTS: sub x y 
5 9 10 
I I  9 
-• trial 15 •-
ftARKET 2 allocat i ons: 
INS: suh x y 
4 B 1 2  
OU TS:  sub ' y 
10 
b i d  
100 






b i d  
1 10 
1 10 
b i d  
80 
b i d  
120 






b i d  
121 





b i d  
2•)fi 


















p r i c1 
120 
price 
7 1  




p r i ce 
180 
70 
p r i c e  
1 8(• 




-t triil I t-
MARKET 1 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
3 15 14 
OUTS: sub x y 
1 9 9 
2 12 13 
4 12 9 
s a 1 2  
6 12 1 3  
"ARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 9 9 
2 12 13 
3 15 1 4  
4 1 2  9 
s a 1 2  
1 2  1 3  
- t  trial 2 t -
"ARKET 1 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub � y 
3 15 1 4  
OUTS: sub x y 
1 9 9 
2 12 1 3  
4 12 9 
s a 1 2  
6 12 1 3  
MARKET 2 a l  l oc at i ons:  
INS:  sub  x y 
OUTS: sub x y 
1 9 9 
2 12 1 3  
1 15 1 4  
1 2  9 
12 
1 2  13 
bi d price 
150 125 














b i d  pr i ce 
200 150 
bid price 
1 50 200 
0 200 
1 1 0  200 
82 200 
10 200 
b i d  price 







-f trial  3 f-
"ARKET I a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y bid price 







3 IS 14 300 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  
1 9 9 150 
4 1 2  9 0 
s a 12 2so 
6 6 7 1 0  
MARKET 2 a l l  orations: 
INS: sub x y b i d  p r i c e  
0 4 12 9 so 
OUTS: sub x y 
1 9 9 
2 4 3 
3 15 1 4  
5 a 1 2  
7 
-t tri al 4 t-
"ARKET I al l ocations: 






INS: sub x y b i d  price 
1 9 9 500 0 
5 9 400 0 
OUTS: sub x y 
2 12 1 3  
3 15 1 4  
5 8 1 2  
6 12 13 
MARKET 2 a l l ocations:  





INS: sub x y b i d  price 
OUTS: sub x y bid price 
I 9 9 0 0 
2 12 13 0 
3 15 14 0 0 
4 5 9 0 0 
5 8 12 0 0 
6 12 13 0 0 
-t trial 5 1-
MARr.ET I a l l ocations: 
INS: sub � y bid price 
I 9 9 500 150 
5 9 4 1 0  150 
OUTS: sub 
2 1 2  13 
3 3 
� l e  
1 0  
b 1  d price 
0 8 1 0  
1 0 0  4 1 0  
275 8 1 0  
ISO 4 1 •:1 
"ARKET 2 a l locations: 
INS: sub x y 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 9 9 
2 1 2  1 3  
3 3 6 
4 5 9 
5 B 1 2  
6 9 1 0  
-t tr i al 6 t-
"ARKET I a l l ocations: 








INS: sub x y b i d  price 
3 9 10 800 185 
5 9 4 1 5  150 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 9 9 
2 4 3 
s a 1 2  
6 12 1 3  
"ARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y 
2 4 3 
6 1 2  13 
OUTS: sub x y 
1 9 9 
3 9 1 0  
4 s 9 
5 8 1 2  
-t tr i al 1 t-
MRKET I a l l ocations: 
bid price 
ISO 415 
0 4 1 5  
600 1 2 1 5  
0 1 2 1 5  
b i d  prict 
99 0 
5 0 
b i d  price 












4 12 9 395 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  
I 9 9 150 
2 12 13 0 
3 9 10 150 
5 1 2  1 0  235 
b 12 1 3  
"ARKET 2 a l l ocat i ons: 
INS: sub r. y bid 
6 12 1 3  2 
price 
0 
OUTS: sub b i d  price 
I 
2 12 1 3  
9 I•! 
12  9 





-f trial  8 t-
MARKET I a l l oc at i ons:  
INS:  sub  x y b i d  
4 5 9 350 
6 9 1 0  1000 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  
1 9 9 150 
2 1 2  13 0 
3 3 6 100 
5 a 12 300 
"ARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x y bi d 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  
I 9 9 0 
2 12 1 3  0 
3 3 b 0 
4 5 9 0 
:; a 12 o 
6 9 10 0 
-t trial  9 •-
"ARKET I a l l ontions: 
!HS: sub x y b i d  
4 1 2  4 330 
5 a 1 2  2000 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  
I 9 9 m 
2 12 1 3  0 
3 3 6 ISO 
12 13 999 
"ARKET 2 a l l ocati ons: 
!HS: sub x y b i d  
OUTS: s u b  x y b i d  
I 9 9 0 
2 12 13 
3 3 6 
4 1 2  4 
s 8 1 2  0 
6 12 13 0 
-t tri al 10 1-



















8 1 9  
price 
2 180 
2 1 80 
330 









INS: sub x y b i d  price 
I 9 9 ISO 100 
3 9 1 0  �(10 1 0 1  
OUTS: s u b  x y b i d  p r i c e  
2 4 3 0 99 
1 2  ' 
1 2 
t (l  
25(1 35(1 
251 3'0 
1 00 1 5(1 
"ARKET 2 a l l ocat l ons:  
INS: sub x y b i d  p r i ce 
2 4 3 99 0 
OUTS: sub 
I 
3 9 1 0  
4 1 2  9 
5 8 1 2  
6 9 1 0  
- f  tri al 1 1  t-
"ARKET 2 a l l ocations: 






JNS: sub x y bid  price 
4 5 4 10 0 
s a 12 97 1 0  
OUTS: sub x y 
2 12 1 3  
1 2  13 
-t trial 12 1-
"ARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
b i d  p r i c e  
0 97 
1 0  9 7  
INS: sub Y. y b i d  pri ce 
6 1 2  13 100 97 
OUTS: sub x y b i d  price  
2 1 2  13 0 100 
4 5 9 I 100 
a 1 2  97 100 
-• trial  1 3  1-
"ARY.ET 2 a l l ociltions: 
INS: sub x y b i d  price  
4 1 2  9 200 IOI  
OUTS: sub x y b i d  pri ce 
2 1 2  11 0 200 
5 a 12 101 200 
6 12 1 3  99 200 
-t trial 1 4  1-
"ARKET 2 a l l ocations: 
INS: sub x i bid price  
6 1 2 n 9999 1 10 
OUTS: sub x 1 
1 2  1 3  
1 2  
s a 1 2  




--1- t r i al 1 3  f-
MARKET 2 a l l oc a t i o n s :  
! N � :  sub x y 
3 6 1 0  
5 j 'l  • I.  9 
OUTS : sub x y 
2 8 8 
6 9 1 0  
- !  t r i al 1 4  f-
MARKET 2 al l ocat i on s :  






-t tr i al 
x y 
8 8 
9 1 0  
x y 
6 1 0  
1 2  9 
1 5  f-
MARKET 2 a l l oc at i on s :  
I N S :  sub x y 
2 8 1 0  
5 1 2  9 
OUTS: sub x y 
3 6 1 0  
6 9 1 0  
Per i od 4 
b i d  p r i c e  
50 0 
1 08 1 00 
b i d  pr i ce 
0 50 
1 00 1 08 
b i d  p r i ce 
200 50 
1 1 0 99 
b i d  p r i ce 
50 1 1 0  
99 1 1 0 
b i d  pr i ce 
222 5(1 
1 08 1 0 1  
b i d  p r i ce 
50 1 08 
1 0 1  1 08 
G l ob al  Send error at Ex peri ement end 
Data not wr i t t en to f i l e  
Fi nal  Tr i al Data ( used f u l l n umber 
of tr i al s  f or each mar ket ) 
Market 1 ALLOCAT I ONS : 
I NS :  sub x y b i d  p r i ce 
2 6 7 ? 90 
4 1 2  1 3  ? 1 50 
Martket 2 ALLOCATIONS: 
OUTS : sub x y b i d p r i ce 
3 7 7 ? 20 




-t trul l t-
llARKET I •ll oe>hons: 
INS: sub • y 
l 5 4 




1 1  1 1  
MRt.'.ET 1 .i l l outions: 
INS: sub x y 
2 3 6 
6 1 1  1 1  
OUTS: sub x y 




-t trul 2 1-
""R�.ET I d l outlons: 
INS: sub x y 
I 7 l 
l 5 I 




I I  1 1  
!'!�RkEi 2 .illoc.itions: 
INS: sub x y 
2 9 6 
b 1 1  1 1  























2 1 1  







































-• trul 3 •-
"ARKET 1 • l l oc1hon•s;: 
INS: sub x y bid 
I 7 3 IOI 
J 5 4 JOO 
4 8 12 201 
OUTS: sub x y bid 
2 9 6 0 
5 9 7  200 
6 11 1 1  0 
l!ARkET 2 • l l outions: 
INS: sub x y bid 
2 ' 6 109 
6 11 1 1  30  
OUTS: sub x y bid 
I 7 l 0 
3 5 4 
B 12 
1 
-• trid 4 •-
llARKET I il l oc•hons: 
INS: sub x y �id 
I 7 3 100 
J 5 4 250 
5 6 7 9'11! 
OOTS: s1b x y bid 
2 ' 6 0 
e 12 2:io 
1 1  1 1  0 
l!ARl:ET 2 d l outiom 
INS: sub x y bid 
2 9 6 109 
6 11 1 1  20 
OUTS: sub x y bl d 
I 1 3 0 
3 5 I 0 
-• trul S •-
12 0 
7 
nARkET I all oc•t1ans: 
INS: sub x y bid 
I 7 l 100 
l 5 4 270 
5 6 13  200 
OUTS: sub x y b1 d 
2 9 6 0 
12 






































nAR>ET 2 d loutians: 
INS: sub x y 
2 9 6 
4 e 12 
OUTS: sub x y 
I 1 l 
3 5 4 
5 6 ll 
II 11  
-• tri11 6 •-
llARKET I •llautions: 
INS: sub I y 
I 1 l 




5 6 ll 
6 11 1 1  
MARKET 2 •llac•hans: 
INS1 sub x y 
6 11 1 1  
OUTS: sub 
I 




-• trid 1 •-
"ARKET I a l l outtans: 
INS: sub 1 y 
I 1 l 
3 5 4 
5 6 13 




MRKET 2 '1Ioc•tions: 
INS: sub 1 y 
1 15 14 
lltJTS: sub 
I 
3 5 I 
4 9 12  
5 6 ll 









































































-t triil 8 I-
MARKET I • l l oc1hons: 
INS: sub 1 y 
I 7 l 
l 5 4 
5 6 13 
OUTS: so x y 
2 3 6 
8 12 
11 1 1  
nARkET 2 •llac•hons: 
INS: sub 1 y 
6 11  1 1  
OOTS: sub 1 
I 7 
2 3 
l S I 
12 
ll 
-• trhI 9 •-
nARkET I i l l out1 0nu 
INS: sub x r 
I 1 3 
3 5 4 
s 6 13 
OUTS: 1ub x y 
2 IS 14 
B 12 
11 11 
llARKET 2 illocdioos: 
INS: su• 1 y 
2 15 1 4  
OUTS: sub  1 y 
I 1 l 
3 s 4 
8 12 
6 1l 
11 1 1  
-•  triil  10 •-
l!ARkET I • l l oc.t1onu 
INS: sub • y 















































































ftARkET 2 illoullons: 
INS: sub x y 
6 1 1  1 1  
IXJTS: S ub  X r 
I 1 3 
2 15 14 
3 s 4 
-t tri•I 11 t-
12 
ll 
llARkET 2 • l l oulions: 
INS: sub 1 y 
5 12 ll 
OIJTS: sub 1 y 
I 12 13 
a 12 
11 11 
-f trhl 1 2  •-
l!ARr.ET 2 • l l oc1tion1: 
JllS1 •ub x y 
5 12 ll 
6 7 7 
OUTS: sub x y 
I ll 13 
B 12 
-• tri d  ll t-
llARl:ET 2 •lloc•tion5: 
INS: sub x r 
I 4 l 
5 12 ll 
OUTS: sub x y 
4 6 8 
-• lrul 14 1-
ftARtET 2 d l oc.tions: 
INS: sub t y 
I 4 J 
5 n n 
OUT5: 5Ub r r 
I I� 12 





























































-< trid 15 •-
!IARl:ET 2 alloull on•: 
1115: Wb l J �Id 
I 4 J j5 
5 12 ll 90 
OOTS: sob 1 y bid 
4 12 12 65 
6 7 7 10 
Period 2 
-• trul 1 •-
llARKET 1 all oc1tions: 
INS: sub 1 y bid 
I 7 7 100 
5 12 12 9999 
OUTS: sub x y btd  
2 12 IJ J35 
J 15 14 200 
5 4 70 
9 
llARJ:ET 2 •llocations: 
INS: sub 1 y lid  
6 9 7 29 
OUTS: sub x y IU 
I 7 7 0 




-1 triil 2 t-
llARl:ET I illcuhons: 
INS: sub x y bid 
2 7 9 201 
5 9 10 9999 
OOTS: sub x y l i d  
I 1 9 100 































llARt.ET 2 alloutions: 
INS: sul 1 y 
' 5 ' 
6 9 7 
OUTS: sub 1 y 
I 7 9 
2 7 9 
l J ' 
5 9 10 
-1 trhl J •-
llARll'.ET I 1llocilions: 
INS1 sub 1 y 
J J ' 
5 6 9 
OUTS: •ub I y 
I 1 1  9 
2 12 IJ 
5 
9 
PIARKET 2 illDC1tions: 
IMS: sub x y 
2 12 IJ 
4 
0015: sub x 




-• trill 4 t-
PIARl:ET I illoutions: 
INS: sub 1 y 
2 12 9 
5 9 10 
WIS: sub 1 
I 1 1  
l 9 
4 5 
"ARKET 2 illoc•ttons: 
INS: sul x y 
6 9 7 
ours: sub 










































bid  pnc• 
20 0 




-• !rid 5 1-
MRKET I il l outions: 
INSt 1ub x y btd 
' 5 9 250 
6 12 1 0  9999 
OUTS: sub 1 y btd 
I 7 7 0 
2 7 J 0 
J 9 6 350 
5 I 12 
MARKET 2 illocahons: 
IMSt sub 1 y 
2 7 J 
' 8 12 




6 12 10 
-• trill 6 •-
MARKET 1 alloc•tions: 
INSr sul I y 
4 5 ' 






llARJ:ET l ill ocati onsi 
INS: sub • y 
2 7 J 






-t tri•I 7 t-
NARrET I ill orations: 
INS: sub ' y 
4 5 9 
6 12 10 
OUTS: sub 
l 
2 1 l 
10 





































































"ARKET 2 al loCihons: 
IMS: sub 1 y 
2 7 l 
5 8 12 
OUTS: sub 
I 9 
3 3 10 
4 ' 9 
' 12 10 
Prriod 3 
-t trill I •-
MRKET I •lloutions: 
IRS: sub 1 y 
5 5 4 
' 12 10 
WIS: sub 1 y 
I 12 13 
2 9 9 
3 12 ll 
4 ' � 
llARkET 2 11loc1tiao.: 
INS: sub • y 
I 12 ll 
OUTS: sub I r 
2 9 9 




-• trill 2 •-
"ARKET I illDCllions: 
INS: sul • y 
J 12 9 
6 6 8 
OUTS: sub 1 Y 
I 12 1 l  
7 I I  
I 6 






























































MRkET 2 alloutaons: 
IMS: sul • I 
2 7 1 1  
OUTS: sub I y 
I 12 ll 




-t trial l •-
MRKET I al l ocotions: 
INS: sub 1 y 









I I  
9 
1 0  
ftARl:ET 2 ill OCill ons: 
INS: sub • y 
I 12 ll 
OUTS: sub 1 y 
2 1 1  I I  
J 12 9 
4 J 
5 12 
1 2  1 0  
- 1  trul 4 •-
ftARKET I 1lloc11ions: 
INS: sub x y 





NARI.ET 1 d l ocotions: 
INS: sub x y 
4 3 6 
OUTS: sub ' 
2 9 
































































pr I C P  
-• trill 5 •- �t trill 7 t- -• trill 9 •- -• tri •I 1 1  t-
llAR!(ET I d I out10ns: llARKET I •liouhons: llARKET I dloutions: llARKET :? allot•hans: IMS: sub l y bid prict IMS: sub l y bid prict IMS: sub l y bid price IMS: sub l y hid pnct Period 4 I 12 n 270 :?60 I 12 IJ 275 :?70 I 12 IJ 275 :NU l 12 9 100 60 4 J 6 l5 0 4 l 6 75 0 4 J 6 100 75 5 5 4 75 50 Global Send Error OUTS: sub l y bid  prtct OOTS: nb l y bid prict OUTS: sub l y bid  pr1c1 OUTS: sub I y bid  pnca Fi"'l trill ll\aut10n1 only 2 7 II 0 270 2 1 1 1  0 275 2 7 1 1 200 275 2 ' 1 1  60 100 !bids lastl J 12 9 260 270 J 12 9 0 275 J 1 J 75 100 6 6 B 50 75 5 5 4 0 25 5 5 4 0 75 5 5 4 60 100 -• trill 15 t-6 12 10 200 270 6 1 2  1 0  270 275 6 6 B 0 m -• trul 12 t-
llARKET I lll au ti ans: 
,ric1 
llAllKET 2 •llocalta"': llARKET 2 •llautians: 
llARKET 2 dloc•tians: llARKET 2 •llacattans: INS: sub l y bid  IMS1 sub I y bid  pric1 INS: sub 1 y bid price !KS: sub l y bid pnc1 INS: sub l y b i d  priu 4 12 \J � 200 2 1 Ii 10 0 2 7 1 1  50 40 6 6 8 50 0 J 12 IJ 100 75 6 5 ' 1 45 5 5 4 5 0 5 5 4 15 0 OUTS1 sub l bid priu OUTS: IUb l y bi d  prict y OUTS: sob • y bid  price OUTS: sub 1 y bid  price I 12 IJ 0 50 2 11 I I  15 25 llARKET 2 lll outtons: I 12 13 0 10 I 12 IJ 0 50 2 7 Ii 0 0 6 6 8 10 25 IMS: sub ' y bid  pric• J 6 0 5 J 1 2  9 40 50 J 7 J 0 0 5 5 9 75 B5 I 12 12 ? 75 12 10 0 10 4 J 6 0 0 4 J 6 0 0 I 2 6 7 ' 50 6 12 10 0 50 5 5 4 0 0 I 
-t trul 6 •- -t trul IJ •- P1riad 5 
Glabll S•nd Error -· trill a ·-
llARKET 2 dlautians: Fiul trul 1llouttons only llARKET I dlouhons: -• trill 10 t- INS: sub l y b:d price lb1d1 Intl INS: sub 1 ' bid prict llARl:ET I il!DClhons: J 12 IJ 100 75 I 12 13 270 270 INS: sub 1 ' bid prictl llARKET I dlac•tians: 5 5 4 75 50 -t tri•I 15 •-4 6 50 JO I 12 IJ 275 50 INS: 1ub l y bid pric• I OUTS: sub • ' bid pricl OUTS: lub 1 y bid price 4 J 6 75 50 I 12 13 275 270 2 11 1 1  60 100 ftARl:ET I lllDtltiDns: 2 7 11 0 270 OUTS: 1ub 1 y bid pr:tt\ 4 J 6 100 BO · 6 6 8 so 15 IMS: sub I y bid  11nct l 12 9 270 270 2 7 I I  0 m 1  OUTS: sub I bid priu I 5 ' ' 65 y 5 5 4 JO 25 J 7 J 50 75 2 7 7 BO 100 5 12 IJ ' 95 12 10 0 270 5 5 4 0 75 l 12 IJ 270 275 -• trid 14 •-6 6 B 0 275 5 12 9 200 275 ftARKET 2 ii I au ti ans: MRKET 2 allocations: 6 6 8 0 275 llAkKET 2 d I oc•h ans: !KS: sub I y bid pnct IMS: sub ' y bld pr1c1 llARKET 2 •ll DClhDns: IMS: sub 1 y bid pric.t b 15 14 ? 50 6 12 10 20 15 !KS: sub 1 y bid price llARl:ET 2 •ll ocotians: J 12 IJ 100 90 OUTS: sab ' y bid pnc1 2 7 II 50 lO IMS: 1ub l y b:d price 5 5 ' �o 60 I 12 lJ 0 2U 6 6 a 50 JO 6 6 8 50 0 OUTS: sub 1 ' bi d  priCI 2 7 11 15 lO OOTS: sub I ' bi• price OUTS: sub I ' bid pritt 2 l l  11  90 100 J 12 9 0 20 I 12 IJ 0 50 I 12 IJ 0 50 6 6 8 60 90 l 6 0 () J 7 J 0 50 2 7 7 0 0 5 ' 0 0 4 J 6 0 50 l 12 11 0 50 -• trul 15 •-5 4 lo 5u l 6 0 0 
5 4 (• "ARKET 2 •llocahons: 
INS: sub 1 ' bid pnt! 
ll 11 190 90 
5 ' '0 80 
OUTS: <"•b I y b i d  prict 
ll  1 1  90 100 
6 8 BO Iii) 
bper aent 3 
Rando1 Mechan 1 s 1  
Per i od 1 
"arket 1 " u k e t  2 Per t ad 4 Peri ad 2 
Sub I y Sub x y "arket 1 "arket 2 "•r let 1 "u ket 2 
Experi ment 1 3 1 2  1 2  2 5 4 Sub I y Sub l y Sub l y Sub l y 
Rando• Mechanis• 5 3 b 4 9 9 2 9 1 0  3 9 9 l 7 9 3 9 1 0  
Per i od 1 l 4 3 6 5 4 4 7 3 6 1 2  10  
"ar ket 1 Miirket 2 
Sub I y Sub l y Excluded Orders Rank i n g s  Excl uded Orders Ranki ngs Excl uded Orders Riln k i ngs 4 9 1 0  2 a 1 2  Sub l y Sub l y Sub l y 3 2 5 9 6 6 9 10 1 , 2  l 6 1 0  l , 2  2 1 2  9 1 , 2  
5 9 b 1 , 2  5 9 10  1 , 2  
Eic luded Orders Rank ings 4 B 10  1 , 2  
Sub l y Period 2 
3 9 9 1 , 2  "•rket I "•rket 2 Period 5 Period 3 1 2  9 1 , 2  Sub l y Sub l y "arllet 1 "arket 2 "arket 1 "ilfket Z Period 2 l 3 2 4 9 1 0  Sub l y Sub l y Sub l y Sub l y 
"arket I "•rket 2 3 9 9 2 a JO l 1 2  9 2 a 1 0  l 9 9 2 9 7 
Sub l y Sub l y 5 6 7 4 7 9 6 9 10  4 9 1 0  6 a 1 2  l 7 3 6 9 10  
4 9 9 2 5 4 Ex cl uded Orders Ranki ngs Exel uded Ord en; Ranki ngs Excl uded Orders R;mkings 
Sub l y Sub l y Sub 1 y 
Exel uded Orders Rankings 6 7 9 1 , 2  3 9 1 0  1 , 2  3 1 2  9 1 ,2 
Sub l y 5 1 2  9 1 , 2  5 5 4 1 , 2  
3 B 1 0  1 ,2 
5 9 7 1 , 2  Experi 1ent 4 
Rando• "echani s1 Experi ment 5 Period 4 
Experi 1ent 2 Period I Rilndo1 "echani s1 "•rket l "arket Z 
Ri1ndo1 "echani s1 "•rket I "arket 2 Period I Sub l y Sub l y 
Period 1 Sub l y Sub l y "arket I "arket 2 2 6 7 I 6 a "arket I "•rket 2 4 12 1 2  2 15  14 Sub l y Sub x y 4 7 3 3 7 9 
Sub l y Sub l y 4 1 1  1 1  6 a 1 2  5 3 
5 9 1 0  6 9 9 Exc l uded Orders Rilnki ngs 6 3 
4 B 1 0  2 6 1 0  Sub x y E<cl uded Orders Rankings 
l 1 2  9 1 , 2  Sub l y Ex cl uded Orders Ri1nking1 Excl uded Orders Ranlli ngs 3 12  9 1 , 2  l 1 2  1 3  1 , 2  Sub l 
Sub I y 5 9 10  1 , 2  2 9 1 0  1 , 2  3 7 3 1 , 2  b 9 9 1 , 2  3 1 2  9 1 , 2  l 5 4 1 ,2 5 B 1 0  1 , 2  Period 5 
"•rket 1 "•rket 2 
Period 2 Period 2 Sub I y Sub x y 
".irket I "•rket 2 "•rket I "uket 2 I 5 4 2 B B 
Sub l y Sub l y Sub l y Sub l y 4 9 1 0  5 1 2  9 l 1 1  9 3 1 2  1 0  4 1 2  9 2 1 2  3 4 7 9 2 5 4 6 1 3  Excluded Orders R;inki ngs 
Sub x 
E;cluded Oraers Rankings Excluded Orders Ranki ngs 3 9 1 0  1 ,2 Sub l y Sub l y 4 7 � 1 ,2 5 a 12 1 , 2  1 9 9 1 , 2  1 0  1 , 2  3 9 14  1 , 2 
Per i ad 3 5 a 10  1 , 2  
Har<et 1 "'1.rket 2 
Sub I y Sub l y Period 3 
5 9 1 0  4 B 1 2  Harket 1 "•rket 2 !v  1 5 4 Sub I y Sub I y 
2 7 9 I b 7 
Ex c bdea Ord<rs Ranki ngs 4 9 b s s 
Sub l y 
l , �  b b 
t , 2  Excluded Orders Rank1 ngs 
Sub 
l ? 3 l , 2  
Experi1ent I 
ASU" •• th Queue 
Period I 
Period l Period 5 
ftarket I "arket 2 Standby Queue ftarket l "arket 2 Shndby Queue "arket I "arket 2 Stilndby Queut sub 1 y Bid sub X y Bid sub X y Bid "ark et sub X y Bid sub I y Bid sub X y Bid ftilrtet sub I v Bid sub X y Bid sub I y B i d  "arht I I I  1 1  100 6 12 13 50 4 5 9 100 I 2 5 9 10 5 I I  I I  25 4 7 9 JOO l 4 12 12 100 2 I I  I I  50 5 3 6 20 I l 9 6 100 5 9 10 25 3 3 6 25 2 6 12 12 100 2 12 9 30 1 15 6 100 I l 12 9 IBO 5 3 6 10 4 J2 12 150 I 4 J 25 2 8 10 50 I 7 7 so I 3 9 JO 120 5 7 I I  25 4 12 l JOO I 6 s 9 75 6 5 9 20 2 I I  I I  m I 4 5 9 100 I 9 9 JO 6 J2 11 40 2 4 7 9 100 6 8 10 30 I 12 1 0  190 5 9 6 25 5 J 6 JO 2 l 9 14  1 10 5 9 10 45 l 3 6 60 I 5 I I  9 105 5 I I  9 3S 4 8 10 100 6 5 9 30 5 9 JO 50 2 7 13 1 10  5 12 10 50 4 7 9 125 2 12 9 40 6 5 9 120 5 9 6 so 5 9 10 60 2 1 7 7 105 3 9 6 55 6 12 10 12S 5 7 I I  35 3 12 9 195 6 5 9 55 4 5 9 125 5 9 13 30 3 9 10 130 6 8 10 40 I 12 10 200 5 1 5  10 SS 2 12 12 130 2 12 12 90 I 9 10 130 I 9 10 45 l 12 9 205 2 I I  I I  60 6 12 13 135 6 12 13 55 3 9 10 140 2 1 2  9 so I 12 10 210 s 9 10 40 4 12 4 150 l 3 6 40 I 1 1  9 140 l 12 9 215 3 7 9 4S 5 6 13 110 B 12 12 60 5 9 10 14S I 6 10 150 2 1 1  I I  so 2 B 12 115 5 6 7 5 l 9 10 ISO 2 1 1  1 1  175 s 9 10 SS 3 l 14 100 I 7 7 10 5 1 1  9 150 6 s 9 200 2 1 1  I I  60 6 7 9 IOS S 6 7 15 
5 12 10 155 I 7 7 10 I 12 10 IBO 5 9 6 so 
l 12 9 200 I 9 7 SS l l 10 1 10 l 3 6 35 Period 4 I 12 10 205 5 9 6 • 60 6 7 9 m 6 12 13 40 
l 12 9 210 1 9 7 65 125 2 12 12 so "arket I "arket 2 Standby Queue I 12 10 215 2 I I  I I  70 7 9 135 5 12 ll SS sub X y Bi d sub X y Bid sub I y B i d  ftarket l 12 9 220 I I  I I  160 2 12 12 60 6 15 14 130 5 1 2  12 2S 5 1 2  12 so 2 4 12  9 175 4 5 4 50 
2 12 13 13S 6 l 6 5 5 8 10 100 I I I  I I  IBO 
6 IS 14 140 2 12 1 3  S5 2 9 10 lSO 5 12 10 IBS 
3 12 9 180 2 6 7 15 5 8 12 175 
2 6 10 50 5 12 12 50 l 1 2  9 180 
I s 9 llO 6 3 6 30 5 s 12 175 Period 2 
5 8 10 100 2 12 ll SS s 1 2  12 200 
5 8 12 175 l 7 ll 40 5 8 12 200 "ilrket I "arket 2 Standby Queue 2 12 7 140 2 12 13 4S l 12 9 200 sub l y Bid sub l y Bid sub X y Bid "arket I 12 4 ISS 5 12 12 so J 5 9 70 6 I I  I I  10 4 9 10 100 I l 1 2  9 180 1 5 4 35 6 1 1  9 75 2 IS 14  15 4 9 10 150 I 2 6 10 155 6 15 14 SS 9 10 so 6 I I  1 1  25 l 12 9 185 2 12 13 60 4 9 10 100 2 15 14 45 3 12 9 190 6 15 14 6:1 I a 10 100 3 3 4 30 5 8 10 160 2 12 13 70 5 12  9 105 
6 9 6 160 5 9 130 
5 B 12 200 12 IO 1 10  
12 9 115 
12 10 120 
12 9 130 
12 10 lSO 
12 9 155 
a 10 l35 
I I 1 1  14C 
7 9 140 
B lt) 1 45 
"ar�et I 
Experi•ent 2 
ASU" with Uueue 
Period J 
"artet 2 Standby Queue 
sub r Y Bid sub ·r Y B i d  sub r Y B i d  
5 12 13  25 I 7 7 0 2 6 B 20 





































11 9 50 2 6 10 I 0 3 9 10 90 





I J  
6 
I I  
B 
I I  
9 
1 1  
9 





l l  
9 
13 105 2 6 B 10  
3 55 6 1 2  9 0 I 
JO 60 2 12 J2 15 4 
4 50 3 15 14 20 3 
JO ! J O  6 12 13 O J 
65 1 7 7 0 J  
70 3 9 10  
9 75 6 12 9 
10 80 3 9 J O  
1 0  6 
15 3 
20 l 
9 95 6 12 13 25 4 
5 4 50 
7 9 50 
5 4 50 
3 6 55 
9 100 
11 l 1  150 







J O  90 3 1 5  14  30 3 3 6 60 
9 105 2 12  12  40 3 3 
JO 1 1 5  6 7 3 0 '1 5 
9 1 1 5 4 5 4 10 ' � 
JO 90 3 15 4 45 '1 5 





145 6 12 13 0 
95 2 B JO 5 
100 3 9 M 1 5  
I V S  6 12 9 




'1 'l o  
4 � o 
Y �o 






l J  
1 2  



























120 2 12 J2 35 
125 6 7 3 5 
130 3 3 6 J O  
135 6 12  J 3  40 
150 ' 5 4 20 
155 3 15 l4 45 
1 75 
180 











12  13 50 
3 6 25 
12 4 60 
I I  I I  








7 . 0 
14 35 
13  50 










Plarket l Pladet 2 
sub X Y B i d  sub X Y 
5 12 13 50 6 ll I I  
l 3 6 1 0  2 1 5  l 4  
3 5 4 25 5 1 2  1 0  
I 12  1 2  5 5  2 15  1 4  
5 12  J 3  6 0  6 l l  J l 
I 12 12 65 4 9 10  
5 1 2  13  75 4 1 2  1 3  
1 1 2  12  100 6 7 7 
!I 12 13 125 3 5 4 
I 12 12 130 6 l l  l l  
1 8 8 75 3 5 4  
6 l l  l 1  100 2 3 6 
5 12 9 125 5 12 13  
I B I 0 80 6 11  1 1  
3 5 4 50 5 1 2  1 3  
2 3 6 20 4 6 7 
3 12 9 130 
5 12 9 135 
3 5 4 50 
2 3 6 35 
I 8 10 90 
4 12 10 140 
5 12 9 145 
3 5 4 75 
2 3 6 20 
I B HJ 100 
3 5 4 75 
2 3 6 35 
J 12 JO 150 
5 12 13 190 
I 12 12 !?5 
4 6 1 ao 




St andby Uueue 
B i d  sub X Y Bid 
O J B 10 100 
5 2 3 6 20 
35 1 8 8 75 
5 3 5 4 50 
10 2 3 10 40 
15 3 5 4 60 
15  3 5 4 75 
0 3 5 4 75 
20 2 3 6 40 













sub I Y 
5 12 13 125 2 1 2  1 2  o 2 6 a 30 
Market 
l 
6 12 13  
3 i b 
3 3 6 
5 IZ 13 
6 12 t J  
2 12 12 
5 12 13  
170 5 12 13  
25 2 12 1 2  
5 5  I 7 
175 5 12 13  




12 12 195 
1 2  1 3  ,,. .i.. _'J 
lO 2 6 a 50 







Kartet 2 Standbv Oueue Plarlet I 
sub X Y B i d  sub l Y Bid sub l Y Bid 
5 1 1  l l 
12 12 










1 15 1 4  
3 12 1 3  
1 5  1 4  
12 13  
1 5  14  
1 2  13  
I 15 14  




4 7 9 
2 5 9 
7 9 
5 9 
3 9 7 
2 5 9 
I 9 6 
2 5 9 
Plartet l 
sub I Y 
3 1 2  
1 0  5 l l  I I  
150 6 12 1 2  
175 5 7 7 
20 5 1 1  I I  
2 5  4 7 9 
30 3 12 1J  
3 5  2 3 6 
40 b 12 1 2  
4 5  3 12 1 3  
5 0  6 12 1 2  
5 5  3 1 2  13  
6 0  6 12 1 2  
IBO 3 12 1 3  




















Bid sub X Y 
lBO 6 15 14 
s a 10 50 5 12 1 2  
1 5 4 55 
2 b 10 60 
l 5 4 65 
6 10 7•) 
B 10 75 
s 4 ao 
b l(o 180 
1 2  10 es 
12  9 1 70 
12 9 1 75 
12 9 1 85 
10 1 95 
6 15 14  
l 5 4 
25 b 12 12 150 
30 I 3 6 60 
s 6 a a 75 












Fi d sub X Y Bid  
20 I 5 4 90 
is l s 4 eo 
30 l s 4 as 









SUD l Y 
I 12 13  
1 2  
Experuent 3 
ASU" �1th Queue 
Per iod I 
"arket 2 
B i d  sub l Y 










B i d  sub t Y em 
0 6 l I I L  1 0  








12 9 lO 
















1 2  
12 
1 2  





1 2  
I I  
1 2  
9 
1 2  






1 0  
b 
3 
1 1  
1 





1 2  
12 
































10 50 5 
2 10 60 
I L  
1 0  
















1 0  30 
Standb y Queue sub t Y 
"irket 2 
Bid  sub X B i d  sub X Y B i d  











1 2  
1 s  10  
1 2  9 
a 1 0  
9 
20 1 15 14 
20 5 1 1  1 1  
z5 3 a 10 
50 4 12 1 0  
7 5  5 7 9 
90 1 B 10 
!00 4 12 1 1  
1 2 0  I J b 
125 5 7 7 
l�O I 1 6 
10 5 7 7 
100 I 
1 75 5 11 I I  
200 4 12 1 3  
no � 12 12  




1 11 1 70 
9 1 75 
5 I 15 14 30 
lO 3 12 1 2  40 
1 0  5 7 9 15 
20 5 1 1  I I  100 
1 5  3 1 2  10 120 
20 3 B 1 2  90 
45 3 1 2  12 10 
51  I 15 10 200 

















sub X Y 
2 B 
3 12 10 
b 9 10  
Peri od 3 
"arket 2 
Bid  sub X Y 
70 I 12 9 
2S 4 7 1 1  
so 5 12 9 
3 12 10 75 2 B 10 
I 5 9 75 6 9 1 0  
5 12 9 1 00 5 12 9 
3 12 10 125 b 9 1 0  
5 1 2  
4 7 9 
I 5 9 
4 1 
l 5 




1 2  
1 5  
1 2  
Karket l 
1 0  
1 0  
1 0  
1 0  
sub X Y 
l 12 1 2  
3 7 
ISO S 12 9 
100 4 7 1 1  
1 10 2 B 10 
m o 9 lO 







B i d  sub X Y 
so 2 12 13  
25 l 12 1 2  
5 9 10 60 2 12 1 3  
b 5 
5 1 5  
3 7 
4 1 2  
4 3 0  5 1 5  14 
1 4  100 6 5 4 
9 90 1 12 1 2  
9 70 2 b 
Standby Queue 
B i d  sub X Y 81d  
25 I 5 4 1 0  
30 2 B 10 5 0  











B i d  sub t Y Bid 
10 I 12 12 4 0  
so 3 1 1  1 1  so 
bO 4 1 2  9 70 
7S 3 9 9 75 
















10 75 2 12 13 90 
12 9 100 5 15 1 4  100 
1 2  1 0  125 
1 2  9 150 
b 
a 
1 2  














1 0  















sub X Y 
3 12 13 
b 12 1 2  
I 6 7 
5 s 4 
I 6 7 




B 1 2  
9 10 
12 7 
1 1  9 
I 12 7 
2 1 I L  
8 1 2  
Penod 5 
"arket 2 
Bid sub X Y 
100 3 12 13 
1 10 2 7 7 
90 5 s 4 
100 2 7 7 
1 10 3 12 1 3  
1 15 5 s 4 
120 4 15 14 
1 15 3 12 1 3  
1 2 0  4 15 1 4  
1 2 S  3 12 1 3  
I S O  2 7 7 
155 5 s 
160 4 15 14 
165 3 12 1 3  
1 3 5  4 15 14 
140 3 12 13 
Standby Queue 
B i d  sub X Y B i d  
20 6 12  1 2  90 
10 s 5 4 40 
15 4 IS 4 bO 
20 4 3  6 50 
30 
25 












EK per i 1ent 1'1 
ASU" w1 th Queu! Period � 
Prr i od I Peri od 2 
"arket I "arkrt 2 Standby Queue 
"arket I "arkrt 2 Standby Uueur "arket I "arket 2 Standby Oueue sub I y B i d  sub X y Bid  sub 1 y B i d  "ar ket  
sub  I y Bid  sub X y Bid  sub X y B i d  �arket sub X y B i d  sub X y B i d  sub X y B i d  "ark et 6 8 1 2  100 I 15 14  60 I j 6 40 I 
2 1 2  1 2  100 4 3 2 50 4 5 4 70 2 3 5 4 50 I 12 12 50 s 7 9 55 I 5 I I  7 65 2 5 4 15 5 9 9 7S l 
s 6 7 65 I 9 1 1  60 4 s 9 80 I 4 12 1 3  JO 2 3 6 20 4 9 10 90 I 3 1 2  7 75 I IS  H 60 5 7 9 100 
9 6 105 6 4 3 1 0  4 1 2  9 100 I 6 I I  1 1  40 4 6 1 0  55 4 6 1 3  60 2 4 12 9 150 3 1 2  1 3  100 I 9 IQ so 
1 2  1 2  1 1 0  4 3 9 65 1 7 7 20 2 4 1 2  1 3  50 I 1 2  1 2  60 6 8 8 50 I 15 14 105 
9 6 1 15 I I I  I I  70 6 I I  I I  60 6 7 7 25 3 1 2  7 1 60 3 1 2  1 3  1 1 0  
1 2  1 3  120 2 1 2  1 2  70 4 1 2  1 3  70 I 1 2  1 2  70 4 12 9 1 70 l 15 14  120 
I I  1 1  1 90 6 1 2  3 75 6 I I  I I  80 6 7 7 75 3 1 2  7 1 80 4 4 3 30 
7 9 70 2 12 12 BO 4 1 2  1 3  90 I 12 12 90 4 1 2  9 200 2 s 4 20 
5 12 1 0  185 6 12 13 85 6 I I  I I  100 6 7 7 100 3 1 2  7 2 1 0  
7 7 85 3 3 6 5 4 1 2  1 3  120 I 1 2  1 2  105 4 1 2  9 2 1 5  
7 9 90 4 5 4 1 0  6 I I  I I  125 6 7 7 1 1 0  3 1 2  10 230 
7 7 95 3 3 6 1 5  4 12 13 1 30 l 1 2  1 2  1 20 5 7 9 75 
7 9 100 4 5 4 20 6 I I  I I  135 4 6 7 35 6 B B BO 
I 7 9 190 3 3 6 40 5 7 9 SS 5 7 9 100 
5 12 10 125 4 5 4 50 3 5 4 60 6 8 8 105 
4 12 9 130 3 3 6 40 5 7 9 75 5 7 9 1 15 
5 1 2  10 150 4 1 2  9 90 3 5 4 80 6 8 8 1 20 
6 1 2  9 155 3 3 1 0  4 5  5 7 9 95 5 7 9 1 30 
6 12 9 155 6 7 9 so 3 5 4 1 10 4 1 2  9 235 
5 1 2  10 1 65 5 1 2  1 3  200 6 8 10 1 35 
6 12 9 1 70 4 6 7 L IS  
5 1 2  10 IBO 3 1 2  9 i.15  
6 1 2  9 185 5 12 1 3  220 Peri od 4 
5 1 2  1 0  200 3 1 2  9 230 
6 1 2  9 205 5 1 2  1 3  250 "arket I llarket 2 Standby Qu!U! 
5 1 2  10 210  3 5 4 100 sub I y B i d  sub I y Bi d sub X y B i d  "ark!t 
6 1 2  9 2 1 5  3 7 9 40  2 6 7 20 5 B 8 2S I Period 5 5 1 2  1 0  220 4 I I  J I  30 4 1 1  I I  25 4 I 9 1 70 I 
6 12 9 22:1 Standby Queue I 12 9 35 6 9 IQ 30 5 1 2  1 2  2 1 0  I "arket I "arket 2 4 I I  I I  50 4 1 1  I I  35 5 5 1 2  10 230 sub I y Bid  sub X y B i d  sub X y Bid ";irtet 8 1 2  195 
1 
I 1 2  9 60 6 9 10 40 5 1 2  1 2  225 5 15 1 4  150 3 9 9 30 4 1 2  1 2  1 10 4 I I  I I  75 • I I  I I  50 6 5 4 50 I 1 2  1 3  so 5 9 1 0  100 I I 1 2  9 BO 6 9 1 0  60 2 12 9 lbO J 7 7 I S  3 9 9 75 I 4 I I  I I  90 1 5 4 25 4 e 10  55 5 3 6 20 3 I I  1 1  40 2 I 1 2  9 100 2 9 IQ  30 5 3 1 0  7 5  3 7 7 25 4 II 1 1  120 I s 4 35 4 e 1 0  1 05  5 3 6 30 I 1 2  9 1 25 2 9 1 0  50 6 5 9 1 10 3 7 7 35 5 B 1 0  70 I 5 4 60 4 8 1 0  1 20 2 1 2  9 55 3 7 9 100 4 I I  I I  70 6 5 9 1 25 I 12 13 60 5 1 2  1 0  1 35 I 1 2  9 135 4 1 2  10  1 65 I 1 2  9 140 4 7 9 5 2 12 9 170 5 1 2  1 0  1 50 6 3 6 20 4 12 10 175 2 6 1 0  90 4 7 9 30 2 1 2  9 185 4 I I  9 1 70 6 3 5 35 4 1 2  1 0  190 3 1 2  9 201) 4 7 � so 2 1 2  9 200 5 8 10  1 10 
4 1 2  1 0  205 4 7 I I  I i5 
2 1 2  9 215  5 8 10  ! 40 
1 2  1 0  221) 4 7 1 1  m 
2 1 2  9 230 5 9 l •) l �S  4 12 1 0  m 4 7 1 1  1 7•) 
2 1 2  9 240 � 8 ! (t 1 75 
1 2  1 0  m 
:i�tr 1 1tr1t J 
f!�\J" 
Ptr i oc 1 
!li:iH·t ! �•d•t :: 
!.:J.L l Y 
6 B 
&1 a •ub I I 





" 9 Su 









10  Su 
9 
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